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Business Incentives, Interstate Competition,
and the Commerce Clause
Clayton P. Gillette*
INTRODUCTION
Recent literature has begun to address whether legal doctrine can be employed to constrain certain forms of competition
among localities and states for business development.1 The argument has taken place primarily in discussions of whether Congress possesses authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
constraining legislation and, if it does, whether Congress
would be well advised to do so. The claim for intervention rests
on a combination of theoretical and economic arguments about
the consequences of interstate competition, and a confidence in
the capacity of courts to distinguish in either a logical or formal
manner between appropriate and unsuitable policies to induce
businesses to locate or remain within a particular jurisdiction.
In this Article, I cast a skeptical look at these arguments.
My objective is not to demonstrate that the alleged "war between the states" or "arms race" does not or could not exist.
Rather, my concern is that the feared scope and consequences
of such competition may be overblown, and that the benefits of
such competition may be understated. Furthermore, the pro* Perre Bowen Professor of Law and John V. Ray Research Professor of
Law, University of Virginia School of Law. My thanks to the participants at
the Conference on the Law and Economics of Federalism, co-sponsored by the
University of Minnesota Law School and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and those at a workshop at University of Virginia School of Law. I
am particularly grateful to David Dana, Dan Farber, Jack Goldsmith, Kevin
Kordana, Saul Levmore, and George Triantis for comments on earlier drafts.
1 See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraintson State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV.
377 (1996); Philip P. Frickey, The CongressionalProcess and the Constitutionality of FederalLegislation to End the Economic War among the States, THE
REGION, June 1996, at 58; Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL. L.
REV. 789 (1996).
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posed remedy-federal intervention-imposes additional costs,
both in removing from states the capacity to promote the values
that underlie federalism and in introducing into legal analysis
distinctions that cannot help but fly in the face of logical consistency. Indeed, the stronger form of my claim is that competition among states for businesses may actually facilitate the
objective created by the Commerce Clause of achieving economic
integration for the benefit of the nation as a whole.
The very claim that competition for business location will
have a negative impact seems odd. We typically think of competition as an effective mechanism for allocating scarce social
resources to the party that values them most highly, and there
initially seems little reason to believe that governmental bids
vary from this principle. Although Tiebout models of local government services are usually directed at the market for residence, 2 the same desire for preference satisfaction should apply
to the market for firms. Indeed, the package of local public
goods and services that a jurisdiction offers, and the tax prices
charged for them, is frequently explained in terms of the jurisdiction's capacity and desire for attracting businesses. 3 Just as localities offer a package of goods and services in order to attract
a relatively homogeneous group of residents, and thus ensure
the efficient delivery of local public goods, businesses that seek
a particular type of environment, work force, or package of
goods and services will gravitate to those locations that signal
their desire to attract firms with similar preferences.
Of course, the packages offered by states and localities do
not indicate that they have unlimited desire to attract businesses, any more than their capacity for residents is uncapped.
Instead, for each package of goods and services established by
a state or locality, there is an optimal size population, including
businesses, determined by the number of residents for which4
the package can be produced at the lowest average cost.
2. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956) (using the examples of residents of a government
housing project and other residents in the community).
3. See Dan A. Black & William H. Hoyt, Bidding for Firms, 79 AM.
ECON. REv. 1249, 1249 (1989) (contending that government subsidies to firms
facilitates the efficient location of industry); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M.
Schwab, Economic CompetitionAmong Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancingor
DistortionInducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 335-36 (1988) (proposing a model
for inteijurisdictional competition in which jurisdictions compete for stock
capital by lowering taxes and relaxing environmental standards).
4. See Tiebout, supra note 2, at 419 (stating "there is an optimum com-
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Communities below the optimum will use incentives to attract
residents (including businesses), and thus decrease average
costs, while those above the optimum are likely to reduce services until a sufficient number of residents (including businesses) emigrate.5 Indeed, there is some reason to believe that
states and localities are particularly adept at and appropriate
for pursuing policies that match businesses and location. Paul
Peterson, for instance, contends that developmental policies,
those programs that enhance the economic position of a community, albeit at the expense of neighbors, are best implemented by local or state, rather than national governments in
order to permit greater satisfaction of preferences between
6
those who provide and those who consume service packages.
Locational incentives directed at businesses would appear,
on their face, to serve these objectives of interstate competition.
Indeed, much of what we normally think of as the characteristics that make a community attractive may easily be cast as
"business incentives," since they correlate well with the factors-for example, access to transportation, infrastructure,
education, level of unionism, climate-that serve as a primary
basis for business location decisions. From this perspective,
governmental use of subsidies, exemptions, and abatements
simply constitutes the business counterpart to well-accepted
forms of competition among other state actors bidding for
munity ... defined in terms of the number of residents for which this bundle
of services can be produced at the lowest average cost.").
5. Tiebout expands on this phenomenon in light of the political reality
and explains that officials will not want to preside over a shrinking population

as follows:
The case of the city that is too large and tries to get rid of residents is more difficult to imagine. No alderman in his right political
mind would ever admit that the city is too big. Nevertheless, economic forces are at work to push people out of it. Every resident who
moves to the suburbs to find better schools, more parks, and so forth,
is reacting, in part, against the pattern the city has to offer.
Tiebout, supra note 2, at 420.
6. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMIS 42-43, 69-70 (1981) (discussing
developmental policies).
7. See, e.g., KEON S. CM, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, ECONOMIc
DEVELOPMENT IN THE STATES: STATE BUSINESS INCENTIvEs AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 9 (1989)
(noting that transportation and economic factors, such as infrastructure, education, climate, and services, are important factors in the location of industries); Roger W. Schmenner et al., GeographicDifferences and the Location of
New ManufacturingFacilities,21 J. URB. EcON. 83 (1987) (proposing the use
of divisional decision stages and plant-specific characteristics to modify the
empirical study of plant locations).
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scarce resources. For instance, state universities bid for students
by offering scholarships and positions on sports teams, and advertising campaigns by states indicate fierce competition for
tourism dollars. No one suggests that such actions are barred
by the Commerce Clause. Certainly those law professors who
contend that federal intervention is necessary to prevent states
from engaging in explicit bidding for businesses have not suggested that there exists any Commerce Clause barrier to state
law schools offering some salaries out of line with those of others
in order to attract or retain faculty members.
Thus, it cannot be that the Commerce Clause seeks to
prohibit all forms of interstate competition. If there is an argument against business incentives, it must be that they possess some feature or consequence that distinguishes them from
other competitive tools. Moreover, those characteristics must
be distinguishable in some principled way from other cases in
which we find no objection to interstate competition.
The negative reaction to competition lies at least partially
in the same intuition that underlies the Commerce Clause.
Contemporary literature views the Commerce Clause largely
as a response to fears that states, left to their own devices,
would regulate trade in a protectionist manner, and thus seek
to exploit monopolies or otherwise impose external costs that
the regulating state did not have to internalize. 8 Thus, states
would likely regulate even where regulatory costs exceeded
benefits, as long as those costs are imposed on residents of
other jurisdictions, or on politically powerless groups within
the regulating jurisdiction.' Protectionism would have the ad8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce
Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1363-64 (1994) (recognizing that judicial oversight might be required when
state policies create extra-territorial effects); Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 563 (1983) (showing that
the distinction between "interferences" and 'exploitations" has descriptive and
normative value in understanding the judicial response to interstate trade
barriers); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092
(1986) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause should be interpreted to
prohibit states from engaging in economic protectionism); Cass Sunstein,
Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 633, 640 (1991) (noting
that the Commerce Clause solves situations when a state pursues self-interest
that is destructive to all the states).
9. If the states imposed regulatory costs exclusively on the jurisdiction's
residents, there might be less reason for federal intervention, unless the burdened group fell within a category entitled to special protection under federal
law. Groups that lack political power as a result of some mechanism other
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ditional effect of inviting retaliation, so that consumers in the
initiating state would also suffer.
Opponents of business incentives attribute this same
negative result to efforts to attract firms from other jurisdictions. Each state, on this view, must preempt or retaliate
against raiders by offering their own incentives to retain or attract business. The result is allegedly a "race to the bottom" in
which mobile firms, which might be well positioned to share
the redistributive tax burden imposed by states, are able to bid
jurisdictions against each other to the point where the firms
become subject only to benefit taxes. The bidding process under these conditions creates deadweight losses from the national perspective, as any gain that one jurisdiction obtains by
attracting a firm is offset by the loss to another jurisdiction. As
a corollary, states would underinvest in redistributive programs in order to reduce financing requirements that mobile
firms would find objectionable, or that would otherwise have to
be imposed on existing residents.1" Presumably, all states
would elect to prevent this scenario, but none can act unilaterally without becoming a net loser in the war for industry, and
transaction costs preclude multistate agreements that might
otherwise preclude each state's opportunistic behavior. As in
the traditional prisoner's dilemma, a centralized entity-the
national government-is seen as the mechanism for implementing the deal that all parties desire, but none can enforce.
The inteijurisdictional causes of net social losses are allegedly exacerbated by intrajurisdictional losses. Bidding states
and localities allegedly overpay relative to the gains they receive by attracting new business. This claim is perhaps more
interesting, for it assumes systematic miscalculation by state
and local officials. Here, the culprits are 1) cognitive error
manifested in the "Winner's Curse," which posits that winners
of common-value auctions will tend to bid in excess of the return they receive or should expect to receive from their investment; and 2) capture of the decisionmaking process about providing incentives by those who benefit from the incentives
provided.
than invidious discrimination may simply be the inevitable losers in any system that operates under majority rule.
10. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and

Regulation, in

THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 111,

115-45 (George C. Eads & Miichael Fix eds., 1984) (arguing for the continuation of "cooperative federalism").
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Empirical studies that seek to evaluate these allegations
are inconclusive." This is exactly what one would expect given
the difficulty of identifying the effects of a subsidy, especially if
one recognizes that the relevant benefit to which cost must be
compared is the benefit to the subsidizing jurisdiction and not
simply to the courted firm. 2 Different states mean different
things by "economic incentives," making comparisons based on
the states' own reports difficult, and some benefits resist objective measurement." Additionally, researchers have used
different variables in trying to measure the effects of such
policies as property tax reductions, and much of the debate has
involved the issue of how best to model the determinants of industrial location. 14 In the absence of hard data, it may be useful to resort to theory and ask whether there are reasons to believe that the adverse effects suggested for business incentives
will predominate, or whether there are competing reasons to
suggest that they will be more moderate than some profess.
11. See Chris Farre, The Economic War among the States: An Overview,
THE REGION, June 1996, at 4, 6 (explaining that economic studies suggest that

programs which award business incentives have a positive, but small, impact
in manufacturing); INDUSTRY LOCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 13-80 (Henry
W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan M. Schlottmann eds., 1991) [hereinafter INDUSTRY
LOCATION] (discussing theory and methodology of industry location determinates);
Joe Mattey & Mark Spiegel, On the Efficiency Effects of Tax Competition for
Firms, THE REGION, June 1996, at 50 (arguing that empirical evidence, which
suggests revenue losses occur from competition, are partly offset by increased
taxes from other sources); Joseph M. Phillips & Ernest P. Goss, The Effect of
State and Local Taxes on Economic Development: A Meta-Analysis, 62 S.
ECON. J. 320, 320-22 (1995) (statistically analyzing results across empirical studies
that assess the impact of state and local taxes on economic development).
12. See Dick Netzer, An Evaluation of InterjurisdictionalCompetition
Through Economic Development Incentives, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTs:

EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FED-

ERALISM 221, 232-34 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991)
(discussing the problems with the effects of a government subsidy as an economic development measure).
13. See, e.g., CM1, supra note 7, at 28 ("[T]his review alludes to the complexity and non-quantifiable nature of the effects of business incentives. It
includes uncertainty, subjectivity and other unknown and uncontrollable factors in the negotiation process that goes on between governments and businesses.").
14. See, e.g., Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of Property Taxes and Other
Local Public Policieson the IntrametropolitanPatternof Business Location, in
INDUSTRY LOCATION, supra note 11, at 63-70 (discussing the issues of landprice capitalization and community characteristics in modeling intrametropolitan industrial location). On the limitations of survey approaches,
see F.J. Calzonetti and Robert T. Walker, FactorsAffecting Industrial Location Decisions:A Survey Approach, in INDUSTRY LOCATION, supra note 11, at
222-30.
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In Part I of this Article, therefore, I consider in greater
depth the arguments against incentives. I suggest reasons for
skepticism about the critique of incentives, and suggest why
such programs might satisfy tests of intrajurisdictional rationality and acceptable political process. In Part I1, I consider
the possibility that business incentives impose inteirjurisdictional costs, and suggest that incentives may instead induce
matching of firms and locations that serves interjurisdictional
welfare. That Part also discusses whether the judiciary or
competitive processes themselves are more capable of distinguishing between business incentives that contribute to social
welfare and those that impose the costs feared by the critics. I
conclude with some remarks about the desirability of harmonization in state economic policies.
I. INTRAJURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES
In this Part, I consider claims that incentive programs
harm the offering jurisdiction, wholly apart from any interjurisdictional effects. These claims center on the contention that
officials who offer incentives systematically miscalculate the
benefits to be generated by attracted or retained firms. If anticipated financial benefits do not materialize, the result of the
promised incentives, which generally take the form of financial
relief to the firm, is that the jurisdiction's total revenues decline. Relief may take the form of exemption from taxes or the
dedication of public moneys to the firm. Thus the jurisdiction
must make up the forgone revenue from other sources or provide fewer public goods. To the extent that jurisdictions do
provide public goods, payment is distorted, since mobile firms
are allegedly able to bargain taxes down to the point that they
are paying only benefit taxes. The tax burden for redistributional efforts shifts to less mobile entities and individuals,
notwithstanding the relative capacity of mobile firms to bear
the redistributional burden.
These claims deny the basic premise of the competitive
story about incentives, that is, that they facilitate optimal
matching of firms and jurisdictions, and suggest that incentives are self-defeating in that they hurt the very jurisdictions
that offer them. Such claims are typically accompanied by anecdotal evidence, such as the substantial subsidies offered for the
Saturn plant or the Supercolider project. 5 However, anecdotal
15. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 1, at 389 ("Five years later, the cost for
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evidence proves only the possibility of localized miscalculation,
not its systemic presence; carried to its extreme, the claim that
miscalculation of benefits warrants limits on competition
would undermine the argument for private sector competition,
since miscalculation is hardly unique to public sector investments.1 6 Thus, legal intervention would be warranted, at best,
if there were grounds to believe that states and localities systematically miscalculated the value of the incentives they offered and did so for reasons not equally attributable to private
firms.
A. WINNER'S CURSE OR WINNER'S CURE
Two explanations for systematic miscalculation have been
offered. The first takes the form of the Winner's Curse. The
phrase describes a cognitive phenomenon of routinized overbidding by winning bidders in common-value auctions. The
rationale for its presence is that where there are multiple bidders for the same good, the winner is required to bid more aggressively. As a result, the probability that the winner will
have overestimated the value of the good increases, since those
with lower estimations will not win the auction.1 7 Both field
studies and experimental data reveal that the Winner's Curse
is "a general phenomenon exhibited by most agents.""8 In addition, there is some evidence that the phenomenon persists
with experience, although its magnitude and frequency may
decline. That is, those subject to the effect learn little from
their mistakes. 9 Worse from the perspective of business incentives, these underlying judgmental errors may be enhanced
where the estimator has limited liability for mistakes.2 0 As I
Tennessee to attract GM's Saturn plant, with its 6000 jobs, had risen to $150
million in state and local incentives.").
16. For debacles in private sector investments, see, for example, Barnaby
J. Feder, Quaker to Sell Snapple for $300 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1997,
at D1 (reporting that Quaker Oats sold Snapple for 1.4 billion dollars less
than it paid for the company).
17. See RicaARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF EcoNoMIc LIFE 50-51 (1992) (explaining the "Winner's

Curse").
18. Barry Lind & Charles R. Plott, The Winner's Curse: Experiments with
Buyers and with Sellers, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 336 (1991).
19. See id.
20. See Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., The Winner's Curse and
Public Information in Common Value Auctions: A Comment, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 347 (1991) (positing that the factor of a bidder's limited liability
significantly affects the equilibrium bidding strategies for rational individuals
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suggest below, there are public choice reasons to believe that
state and local officials will be able to insulate themselves from
blame for mistaken decisions about subsidies. If that is true,
then the officials enjoy the political equivalent of limited liability
in that the major avenue by which their tendency to overbid
can be checked-electoral accountability-has been eliminated.
Thus, there are reasons to believe that the Winner's Choice
heuristic would systematically induce overpayment to attract
firms.
There are countervailing considerations, however, that
both moderate the effect of the Winner's Curse in location decisions and suggest instead that high bids may play a more
positive social role. Bidding would presumably be consistent
with competitive objectives if it allowed more accurate matching of
jurisdictions and firms, that is, if firms use the bidding process
to identify jurisdictions where they will be optimally productive. If bids provide information otherwise unavailable to
firms, but known to the bidding jurisdiction, then bids provide
a cure to the joint problems of asymmetric information and
suboptimal productivity rather than a psychological trap.
1. A Critical View of the Winner's Curse
Before turning to the issue of whether bidding can cure
these problems, there is a more critical reaction to the claim
that the Winner's Curse infects bidders for firms. The conditions under which jurisdictions make bids frequently do not fit
the ideal conditions under which the Winner's Curse arises.
First, the possibility that winners of auctions will be disappointed with results is directly correlated to the number of bidders. While there may be multiple bidders for some highly
publicized businesses (such as the Saturn plant), assuming
that jurisdictions seek an optimal, not maximum, number of
businesses, other auctions are likely to attract few bidders, so
that the possibility of substantial numbers of lesser bids will be
reduced in those settings. Even if bids are implicit-such as
where the incentive takes the form of a statutory abatement
granted to all firms rather than a negotiated deal for a specific
firm, so that theoretically all states are bidding (since all states
offer some form of statutory incentives 2 )-firms are unlikely to
0
in an auction).
2L See Cm, supra note 7, at 12-113 (highlighting the state business tax
and financial incentive programs of each state).
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weigh all jurisdictions equally, because only a few may offer
the other amenities that affect plant location.
Second, the Winner's Curse typically is attributed to bidders who are engaged in one-stage, sealed-bid auctions. That
is, each bidder submits a single bid that cannot be revised and
no bidder has reliable information about what other bidders
are doing. A bidder who knows the content of other bids and
who is able to revise her initial bid (upwards or downwards) in
light of that information is less likely to be susceptible to the
Winner's Curse. She can better calculate the expected value of
a winning bid in light of information from other bidders that
the firm has a value different than the one she initially assigned to it.22 Firms do not typically make locational decisions
based on one-stage, sealed bids. Instead, they negotiate with
one or more jurisdictions about the terms under which they
will locate. These terms frequently are made public prior to
the time when the final location decision is made. Thus, there
is little reason to believe that the conditions most conducive to
materialization of the Winner's Curse exist in location decisions.
Third, note that the Winner's Curse is predicated on commonvalue auctions, that is, auctions in which the item being bid for
has a single, but unknown objective value, typically reflected in
its market value. Common-value auctions, for instance, may
involve bidders who intend to resell the auctioned good on the
open market.2 3 In some sense, competition among states for
the same business might be thought to fall within this category-a plant that will offer one hundred jobs might be thought
to be of the same value in North Carolina as it is in North Dakota. If the Tiebout story about optimal size of localities is cor22. See Steven J. Brains & Alan D. Taylor, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKECUTTiNG TO DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 188-98 (1996) (discussing the effect of providing auction bidders with information on the other bidders' initial estimates).
23. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding,
25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 699, 705 (1987) (explaining the "common-value
model" for auctions where bidders intend to resell the item on which they bid).
Auctions may have some of the characteristics of a common-value auction
without fully falling within that category. McAfee and McMillan, for instance,
posit the possibility that bidders at an antiques auction may intend to resell
their winnings, but differ in their selling capacities, "so that the ultimate
market value depends on which dealer wins the bidding." Id. Similarly, I
suggest that different bidders for firms may have different capacities for developing the productive capacities of the firms and thus place different values
on them.
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rect, however, then not only will the plant have positive value
only to locations that are seeking to grow, but that value will also
vary depending on how close the bidders are to their optimal size.
The value of the firm, then, will not be common to all bidders.
2. A Cure to Asymmetric Information and Suboptimal
Performance Problems?
I want to elaborate on the claim that the same firm could
have different value in different jurisdictions, depending on
how that firm fits into an overriding business plan for each jurisdiction. Assume, for instance, that a jurisdiction desires to
develop a particular resource that is not shared by all other
jurisdictions. That jurisdiction may place a higher value on
firms that can assist in the development of that resource than
some alternative jurisdiction that either did not have or did not
want to develop the same resource. Bids in this situation may
be used to convey new information about the value that the jurisdiction places on the firm. It is in this sense that bids may
be viewed as a solution to a problem of asymmetric information.
Even if localities have information, conveying that information solves a problem only if the information is relevant to
the firm's location decision. Even if the conditions for the Winner's Curse are not perfectly reflected in business incentives,
the consequence of that curse, systematic overbidding relative
to actual value, is reflected if all competing localities bid too
high. Certainly that result would occur if bids were superfluous because they did not, in fact, influence business location
decisions. There may be some situations in which we think
that a bid is unnecessary to attract a firm, even though the jurisdiction desires the firm and there would be a good fit between the two. Assume, for instance, that the jurisdiction is
willing to allow exploitation of a natural monopoly that the
firm desires to exploit. If the basis for the monopoly is readily
apparent, then firms that can take advantage of that resource
will be attracted to the jurisdiction without any additional incentive, so that any bid brings about the wasteful results that
the Winner's Curse predicts. A firm that wants to extract minerals
will have to go to the source of the minerals and does not need
additional incentives or information to select that location.
Other industries, however, may be more mobile, so that
firms within the industry could locate with relative ease in any
of several jurisdictions. Even in this situation, the same firm
could have different value to different jurisdictions. This result
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could occur either because the firm would be more productive
in one location than another or because the firm produces
spillover benefits within a jurisdiction that exceed the benefits
that it would produce in other jurisdictions. In the first case,
bids should influence location decisions and would not be superfluous if the bid conveyed to the firm information about
productivity of which it was otherwise unaware. In the second
case, the firm would be indifferent about spillover effects that
did not increase its own productivity, so bids would be appropriate if they induced firms to make locational decisions that
reflected the greater social value of locating in one jurisdiction
rather than another. In brief, bids make sense if they solve
problems of asymmetric information where localities have a
better conception than the firm itself has of the fit between a
particular firm and the plans and needs of the locality. We can
take three different situations to illustrate these conditions. In
each of these cases, the additional value of the firm should be
reflected in the bid, and these additional values may vary significantly.
First, other preferences of the jurisdiction may influence
the type of economic development that it is willing to sponsor.
A jurisdiction that favors a particular form of industry, and
that thus narrows the set of acceptable industries, may place a
higher value on attracting a firm within that set than does a
jurisdiction which is indifferent within a larger set of industries. For instance, a jurisdiction that comprises mountains
and scenic areas and wants to develop its tourist industry to
take advantage of those assets may place a higher value on a
firm that can coexist with a recreational park than a state that
is trying to attract the firm solely for the revenues it can generate. The firm's productivity, however, may not be influenced
by its fit with other objectives of the jurisdiction. That is, it
may be equally productive in a jurisdiction less desirous of attracting environmentally friendly firms. Thus, in attempting
to decide where to locate, the firm may not look at the environmental benefits that the firm is producing for the jurisdiction. As a social matter, however, we would want those benefits to be considered in the location decision, since failure to
take them into account will constitute a lost opportunity. The
firm will become aware of those benefits, and act on them, only
as a function of the ability of the jurisdiction to make a higher
bid that reflects the greater benefit that the firm brings to that
area. Similarly, a jurisdiction that favors environmental safeguards may want to attract "clean" industries, while a juris-
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diction less concerned about environment may be indifferent as
between two firms that impose different levels of pollution,
each of which expects to employ 250 people. Unless the firm
values being in a jurisdiction that favors "clean" industries, its
location decision will be made without regard to the higher
value that it confers on the "clean" jurisdiction, unless that jurisdiction is able to signal that value, and the firm can capture
part of it, by use of the bidding process.
Second, there may be synergies related to productivity of
the courted firm that are identified by one of the bidding jurisdictions, but not others, even though those same synergies
would be realized by any winning jurisdiction. If the firm is
aware of the possibility of such synergies, it may wish to locate
in a jurisdiction that similarly realizes the productive capacity
of those relationships and is willing to make the investment
necessary to develop them, as evidenced by its bid for the
courted firm. But even a firm unaware of potential synergies
may implicitly learn of them through the bidding process. For
instance, one jurisdiction may believe (correctly) that it can develop the productive capacities of the industry, in part because
it has identified the courted firm as a means of attracting additional firms in a manner that other jurisdictions have not
recognized. The location of one firm may influence the location
of other firms that deal in products related to those of the first
firm, as competitors, customers, or suppliers. Firms that locate
along with others can create networks that reduce transaction
costs and that facilitate the sharing of information. For instance, firms that manufacture automobile tires and batteries
are likely to locate near automobile manufacturing plants, and
software companies are likely to locate near each other in order
to take advantage of the opportunities of generating beneficial
network externalities.24 A firm that can generate network externalities may have a greater value to a jurisdiction in which
other firms within the same network already exist than to a
jurisdiction that is initially attempting to create such a network within its boundaries. For instance, one jurisdiction may
attempt to create a reputation as a home to industry of a certain sort, even though firms within that industry have no prior
24. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424-25 (1985) (defining network externalities); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 762-63 (1995) (defining network

externalities).
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reason to locate within that jurisdiction. Thus, California and
Massachusetts have been able to attract software industries
that might with equal ease have located elsewhere. The highly
tailored statutory schemes of some states suggests that the
states have, in fact, identified industries that they seek to attract,2 5 though it is difficult to disaggregate such a desire from
the possibility that those same highly tailored preferences represent a simpler and less productive result of capture. The fact
that the winner has, by definition, paid a price in excess of the
bids of others may reflect that the winner properly recognizes
that there is a first-mover advantage to attracting the courted
firm, or it may reflect a distinct advantage that the winning
jurisdiction believes it has in implementing the productive capacity of the firm.
Third, it may be that all jurisdictions identify the additional value that the firm will generate, and that additional
value may be the same in absolute terms for all jurisdictions,
but the marginal value of the firm will be different because the
jurisdictions are at varying distances from their ideal population
and tax rate. 26 A high bid by one jurisdiction may indicate that
it has greater excess capacity to absorb the kinds of satellite or
related firms that would be attracted by the courted firm, so
that the jurisdiction expects and desires to provide the kinds of
support that would be essential to the growth of the courted
firm. The value of the courted firm to the jurisdiction is not
simply the productive value of that firm alone, but that value
in addition to the value of other firms that may be advantaged
by the first firm. Assume that the courted firm would bring in
$10 of benefits, but would also attract satellite firms that generate an additional $5. For instance, if an automobile plant
were to locate, it might attract tire manufacturers, battery
manufacturers, and restaurants. The jurisdiction should be
willing to pay up to $15 to attract the courted firm, even
though that amount exceeds the benefits produced by that firm
25. See, e.g., CHI, supra note 7, at 23, 55, 100, 108 (describing incentives
offered by several states, including a Massachusetts program directed to attract early-stage, high-risk, technology-based companies; a Utah excise tax
exemption available for certain types of industries; a West Virginia warehouse
tax exemption; and a California program to encourage innovators in development of new technologies).
26. See Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, Taxes, Incentives and Competition for Investment, THE REGION, June 1996, at 55-56 (finding high unemployment jurisdictions offer the largest incentives, although these incentives
do not necessarily translate into higher rates of return).
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standing alone. But whether the jurisdiction is willing to bid
that amount depends on how close it is to optimal size. One
could imagine a second jurisdiction that wanted to attract the
automobile manufacturer, but had little interest in simultaneously attracting satellite businesses. It would presumably bid
no more than $10 for the firm. If the firm itself cared about
having easy access to the related industries, it would treat the
higher bid of the first jurisdiction as a signal of the relative
willingness of the jurisdiction to accommodate the firm's needs
or to create an environment in which the development of network externalities facilitated the firm's productivity. Of course,
these synergies might not be perfect. The firm might be indifferent about whether other industries were attracted by its
presence. This does not mean that the winning jurisdiction is
bidding inappropriately, because the jurisdiction may care
significantly about the fact that the courted firm will attract
others. It only reflects the fact that that the winner places a
different value on attracting the firm than do other bidders.
One response to these possibilities is that the claim of informational asymmetries appears hollow because the firm
should have reliable information concerning objective criteria
that are relevant to the location decision. Most information
that is relevant to the firm's location decision should be available in verifiable form without being subsumed in a jurisdiction's bid. There is no reason to believe that the firm will have
inferior information about such issues as climate, employment
and wage rates, cultural amenities, housing stock, and school
systems that is readily available from objective sources. Thus,
even if these factors are reflected in the jurisdiction's bid, they
do not constitute a solution to a problem of asymmetric information. Nevertheless, certain types of information that will be
less apparent to firms than to jurisdictions might be subsumed
within bids. These instances roughly correspond to the categories of hidden information and hidden action that Kenneth
Arrow has suggested creates problems of asymmetric information.2 7 While these categories are typically seen as potential
mechanisms for driving wedges between principals and agents,
an agent that wants to signal fidelity to a principal may seek
27. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 37, 38-40 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (describing "hidden actions" and "hidden information"
as situations when an agent has information of which the principal is unaware).
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ways credibly to indicate that it is not withholding valuable information; bids may play that role where jurisdictions seek to
ensure firms of the veracity of their intentions to become optimally productive.
Take first the problem of hidden information. The firm is
less likely to have a6curate information about future plans of
the jurisdiction that will affect the profitability of the firm.
This includes such issues as the willingness of the jurisdiction
to accept other firms with which the courted firm may share
network externalities. One might think that incentives are
unnecessary to attract a firm that can generate network externalities, since the firm itself will be aware of that possibility
and thus will locate in any jurisdiction that will accept the additional firms with which the courted firm expects to interact.
The problem is that firms may have difficulty extracting
credible commitments from the competing jurisdictions. In the
courtship process, many jurisdictions may be willing to commit
to enticing related firms, or at least not interfering with their
relocation. A firm cannot, however, rely on promises made by
jurisdictions about their fit with the firm, since localities that
would obtain positive but relatively small benefits have incentives to mimic the marketing behavior of localities that expect
relatively large benefits from attracting the same firm. Talk,
after all, is cheap. The result is that courted firms may be unable to separate claims made by competing jurisdictions about
the future relationship that can be anticipated between the
firm and the jurisdiction.
Alternatively, jurisdictions may have hidden information
with respect to factors that influence the success of the firm.
For instance, the jurisdiction is likely to have superior information about willingness to zone, the need for additional taxation within the near future, and willingness to construct new
roads and new infrastructure necessary to attract satellite industries of use to the courted firm. Bids allow the jurisdiction
credibly to reveal any information that it has about its plans as
well as the fit between the firm's demand for productive inputs
and the assets available in the community.2 8 A high bid in the
form of financial incentives serves as a signal that the bidder
places an idiosyncratic but realistic value on attracting the
courted firm. Should a jurisdiction win an auction on this ba28. See Glenn Platt, An Efficient War Between the States: A Model of Site
Location Decisions Under Asymmetric Information 23 (April 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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sis, the high bid does not reflect overconfidence that will soon
be disappointed, but a very different value on winning the
auction.
In addition, jurisdictions may have superior information
about subsequent action with respect to the firm. Once the
firm has made investments in a plant, it will be difficult to extract itself, notwithstanding economists' admonitions about ignoring sunk costs.29 Thus, the firm is susceptible to strategic
behavior by jurisdictions in the form of reneging on promises,
or chiseling at bargains that have been reached, or changing
the objectives of the jurisdiction. The possibility that a firm
can be lulled into a jurisdiction and subsequently exploited exists
not only with respect to political officials who do not intend to
live up to promises at the time they are made, but also with respect to shifts in public opinion about the desirability of a firm
once it has actually located in a jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
bids may be structured in a way that indicates the bidder's
valuation by creating precommitments against such shifts. A
bid that consists of up-front concessions or enforceable promises
may serve as a bonding mechanism by committing the jurisdiction's resources to a long-term relationship in which reneging is
difficult and shirking unprofitable.
3. Issues of Equity
Even if incentives solve informational asymmetries and
foster more secure bonds, thereby facilitating optimal matches
between firms and locations, two objections remain. The first
is that investment decisions made on the basis of business incentives will distort the relationship between mobile and im29. See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Tax Holidays as Signals, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 820, 820 (1986) (observing that countries are able to raise tax
rates for firms after a firm has invested sunk costs). Of course, until the firm
actually makes a capital investment, it may be able to extricate itself rather
easily and may itself renege on the deal, for example, by constructing a
smaller plant and hiring fewer workers than promised. See, e.g., Melvin L.
Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, CongressShould End the Economic War Among
the States, THE REGION, March 1995, at 10 (describing Northwest Airlines'
construction of facility that would employ fewer than half the number of
workers originally anticipated when it received low-interest loans from the
state). Thus, the attracting jurisdiction may not want to use incentives that
require up-front payments, such as issuing general obligation bonds that the
jurisdiction is required to pay regardless of revenues generated by the courted
firm. On the other hand, firms that provide incentives in the form of multiyear tax-abatements or additions to infrastructure will be able to extricate
themselves from the bargain should the courted firm renege.
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mobile capital. The second is that the burden of redistributive
taxes will be borne unequally, even as total redistributive effort is reduced. The distortion in investment will arise because
only mobile capital will be eligible for incentives. The result is
that persons who would otherwise invest in immobile enterprises
will be less willing to do so because they will be net payors of
subsidies and redistributive taxes, while mobile enterprises
will be net recipients of subsidies and will be excused from redistributive taxes.
Nevertheless, the situation may be more complicated than
first appears. The recipients of business incentives tend to be
large plants that, once located, will be difficult to move to another jurisdiction. Thus, although these plants may be mobile
at the point that the investment decision is made, once the firm
actually locates in a particular jurisdiction, it becomes relatively immobile and may be vulnerable to the decisions of the
same jurisdiction to offer subsequent incentives to additional
firms for which the firms that first moved in (and that received
incentives) will pay. Thus, the distinction between mobile and
immobile capital may be less meaningful than critics of subsidies suggest. Yet it is true that firms that are tied to particular geographical locations, such as mines, will systematically
be deprived of opportunities for incentives. To that extent, distortions in investment may occur. The more difficult issue is
whether those distortions will outweigh any gains that are
achieved by attracting firms to particular areas where they
might be more productive.
Similarly, the possibility that incentives will shift the burden of redistributive taxes to immobile firms and residents
raises issues of horizontal equity, defined as treating similarly
situated parties similarly. These concerns exist independently
of the distortion effects. Assume, for instance, that a jurisdiction
provides $200 worth of redistributive services annually and
that there are two firms in town, X and Y, each of which generates
$10,000 worth of revenues, and each of which pays $100 in annual taxes towards redistributive services. The jurisdiction
now attracts Firm Z to the jurisdiction. Firm Z generates
$10,000 worth of revenues and hires a sufficient number of local
residents that the local redistributive budget falls to $150. Because Firm Z is similarly situated, at least in terms of ability to
pay, to the two firms that are already located in the jurisdiction,
horizontal equity would require that each pay one-third of the
redistributive burden, or $50. Firm Z, however, located within the
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jurisdiction only because it was required to pay no redistributive
taxes during the next year, that is, it received a location incentive that bid its tax rate down to pure benefit taxes. Thus, the
existing firms, which cannot easily emigrate, must each pay
$75, while Firm Z pays nothing. If what we mean by "similarly
situated" is based on ability to pay, the unequal burdens faced
by the X and Y on the one hand and Z on the other suggests a
violation of horizontal equity. The fact that Firm Z's presence
actually reduces the total redistributive payment of the existing firms is irrelevant to the issue of horizontal equity. Nevertheless, providing the subsidy to Firm X does raise the issue of
whether we are willing to accept a certain amount of horizontal
inequity in order to attain a greater social benefit, that is, a reduction of redistributive taxes and an increase in the welfare of
the newly employed residents of the jurisdiction. In effect, we
are imposing on the existing firms an obligation to bear a
greater than proportionate share of the objective of enhancing
welfare for the community at large.
There are a number of things to say about this situation.
We can first point to the imprecise nature of horizontal-equity
claims. While we can agree that horizontal equity demands
that similarly situated parties should be treated similarly,
there exists no independent metric of what constitutes similarity for these purposes."0 The firms in the example are "similar"
in the sense that they all generate the same revenue, and because we think of taxation as properly based on income, that
similarity may be viewed as a proper basis for imposing similar
tax rates. They have other characteristics that make them
dissimilar, however, such as the fact that two of the firms are
already based in the jurisdiction and one of the firms is not.
One might claim that this is not a relevant distinction, because
if one of the firms that existed in the jurisdiction were to stop
production, the loss to the jurisdiction would be the same as
the gain to be realized by attraction of the new firm. However,
not all firms, and not all firms that generate the same amount
of revenue, are of equal value to the jurisdiction. Firms that
provide numerous jobs, that are helpful in attracting addi-

30. See Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of PersonalInjury Recoveries, 1993
Wis. L. REv. 1115, 1155-59 (1993) (describing the difficulties in the application
of the horizontal equity principle); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures
in Search of a Principle,42 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 140-41 (1989) (outlining the difficulties with defining horizontal equity).
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tional employers, or that generate spillover business to firms
already located within the jurisdiction will have a value that is
different from firms that do not have these characteristics. In
that sense, the firms are not similarly situated, so providing
incentives to one but not others is not necessarily a deviation
from horizontal equity. The absence of any a priori reason to
select one of these approaches to "similarity" over the other
makes the horizontal equity claim precarious at the start.
Even if we were to agree that the firms in the example
were similarly situated, it is not clear how strong of a pull
claims of horizontal equity exert on the allocation of social burdens. A variety of situations exist in which we deviate from
horizontal equity when doing so provides the most effective
mechanism of achieving social objectives. Put to one side the
obvious cases in which burdens are indivisible and thus cannot
be shared by all equally or cases in which we would not want
all to participate-for example, drafts during wartime. There
still remain other situations in which burdens are essentially
financial, and thus divisible, yet we permit local governments-the entities involved in location incentives-to impose
unequal burdens. Think, for instance, of rent-control regulations, through which we impose on landlords a greater than
pro rata obligation to subsidize the poor by denying the ability
to charge rents that markets would otherwise allow landlords
to command. 31 Likewise, consider linkage fees that require developers to construct public goods or offer amenities as part of
the price of development.3 While these efforts may rise to the
level of takings if they impose burdens too far removed from
the costs they impose, 33 localities remain able to impose obli31. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 317-19 (1994)
(describing arguments both supporting and criticizing rent control).
32. See Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City of San Francisco, 234 Cal. Rptr. 1
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a development fee as a reasonable fee to compensate the city for increased expenses resulting from development); Bonan v.
City of Boston, 496 N.E.2d 640 (Mass. 1986) (upholding a Boston zoning code,
which required developers to make a linkage payment). See generally ALAN A.
ALTSHULER & Jost A. GOMEZ-IBAMEz,

REGULATION FOR REvENUE: THE

POLITICAL EcONOMY OF LAND USE ExAcTioNs (1993) (discussing methods of
regulating developers which require contributions to the social infrastructure).
33. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994) (holding that a
city's requirement that a property owner dedicate part of her property to the
public in exchange for a building permit violates the Takings Clause); Nollan
v. California Costal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987) (holding that a requirement that a property owner provide a public easement through his or her
property in exchange for a permit to build violates the Takings Clause).
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gations as long as they have some nexus to the development.
Even though the scope of the required relationship remains
undefined, localities retain some discretion to impose conditions that redound to the public benefit. Short of the obscure
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,3 4 jurisdictions remain
able to offer benefits to parties that agree to provide public
goods, such as by selling abandoned homes at deeply discounted prices to individuals who agree to fix them and live in
them for a substantial period of time or to parties who agree to
construct public ways. Hendrik Hartog's recounting of the development of New York City by the grant of waterlots to those
who agreed to make public improvements, including constructing and maintaining wharves, streets, and docks, reveals our
longstanding history of placing a disproportionate burden on
35
those who receive the benefits of governmental discretion.
The fact that we engage in such activity does not justify it. Indeed, there can be little doubt that horizontal inequity creates
distortions in investment, as evidenced by the harsh attacks
that claim rent control leads to an undersupply of housing for
low-income families and disrepair of the available housing
stock for that group. 36 It may suggest, however, that certain
forms of disproportionate taxation provide a politically feasible
means of conferring redistributive benefits on a particular
group that has become acceptable, at least within limited contexts.
In the area of business incentives, the horizontal equity issue is complicated by my hypothesis that subsidizing the new
firm reduces the net outlay of existing firms, albeit not by as
much as would be possible if the new firm both located in the
jurisdiction and paid its proportionate share of redistributive
taxes. We might prefer to have both a lower redistributive
burden and horizontal equity. If we must surrender one, it is
not clear which we would abandon. I suspect that the matter is
one of degree. Tradeoffs between equity and efficiency cannot
easily be reduced to formulaic solutions. 37 The greater the de34. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit"as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
473 (1991) (analyzing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions specifically
in terms of the Nollan decision).
35.

See HENDRiK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 44-59

(1983).
36. See, e.g., Joseph Gyourko & Peter Linneman, Rent Controls and
Rental Housing Quality:A Note on the Effects of New York City's Old Controls,
27 J. URB. ECON. 398, 398 (1990) (arguing that rent control is bad public policy).
37. One principle of imposing unequal burdens that does not seem to
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viation from horizontal equity, the greater the decrease in total
redistributional burden we might demand.38
This tradeoff between social benefit and imposition of unequal burdens may be reflected in the Supreme Court's test for
regulatory takings after Dolan v. City of Tigard.39 In that case,
the Court held that a governmental entity could only impose
conditions on grants of development permission without violating
the Takings Clause if the condition satisfied a "rough proportionality" test. That test examines whether the exactions demanded by the permit conditions are roughly proportional to
the projected impact of the petitioner's proposed development. 0
In essence, the test limits the capacity of government to impose
on individuals the obligation to provide public goods without
offsetting compensation; the negative implication is that we are
willing to accept some degree of imposition, notwithstanding that
it requires some individuals to bear a disproportionate burden
in the creation of public goods.
As long as government operates within constitutional parameters of imposing individualized burdens in the allocation
of public goods and tax burdens, resolving tradeoffs between
equity and efficiency may ultimately have to be a function of
political markets. These markets may decide that absolute
equality is necessary, and thus it is worth surrendering some
potential social gains if they can be achieved only by an unequal allocation of burdens. 41 The assignment of this function to
political markets arises not because they are perfect, but because they have the capacity to consider the variables neceswork here is indivisibility. We cannot, for instance, impose an equal burden
on all persons to fight wars, so we draft a few. But for redistributional purposes, we are only talking about money and that seems to be the quintessential
divisible good. The problem is that the courted firm may not move to the locality if it is required to pay. Thus, much depends upon the assumption that
attracting the firm will decrease the total outlay of redistributive dollars.
38. To return to our university example, it is unlikely that any university
would admit to selling admissions rather than deciding such matters on meritocratic grounds. Nevertheless, it would be the rare university that would not
give extra consideration to the child of a potential multi-million donoi, since
those dollars would inure to the benefit of all the university's students. While
we might suspect a correlation between potential donations and the deviation
from meritocracy, we would (hopefully) be surprised if the prospect of large
gifts generated too great of a deviation.
39.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).

40. See id. at 391.
41. See JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE 70-71 (1992) (describing the principle
of absolute equality which requires that a good which cannot be given equally
to all should be given to no one).
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sary to making decisions among incommensurables. Delegation to political markets makes a somewhat heroic assumption
about the absence of distortions from that market, however.
Because critics of incentives do not find the political decisionmaking process to be so pure, it is to that issue that I turn next.

B. AGENCY COSTS AND LOCATION DECISIONS
The other potential source of systemic miscalculation of
value arises from agency costs between those public officials
who award the incentives and their constituents. Here, the
standard public choice story about the incentives of political
actors initially seems quite compelling. Managers or owners of
firms that will benefit from subsidies have substantial motivation to lobby vigorously for them because these individuals will
be able to capture the gains of their efforts, either in reputation
as managers or in residual profits as owners. Thus, they will
invest in convincing public officials of the benefits related to a
grant of incentives, even if the intrajurisdictional cost of the incentives exceeds the benefits. Other interest groups have
similar motivations to advocate business development, regardless of its net effects on the jurisdiction, because it will generate
net gains for the particular group. Real estate developers and
brokers, for instance, stand to gain from additional development
regardless of its effects on the community as a whole.'
Those who oppose incentives on the basis of their negativesum quality have less reason to monitor officials or to invest in
convincing those officials not to grant incentives. This group
consists primarily of taxpayers who will bear either increased
tax burdens or reduced services as incentives whittle away
business contributions to redistributional goods. On an individual basis, however, these effects are minute compared to the
personal costs of opposition. In addition, because opposing an
inefficient subsidy has the characteristics of a public good, any
given opponent can receive the same benefit without incurring
the related costs if someone else undertakes the opposition effort.
Nor will officials who miscalculate (or who knowingly grant
negative-sum incentives to favored groups) necessarily suffer
electoral redress, since the binary nature of voting means that

42. See Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of NonshareholderContributions
to Capital:An Economic Analysis, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1488-92 (1992)
(describing the operation of public choice theory in which a small group is
benefited at the expense of a large group).
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voters must cast ballots based on the overall performance of
officials. A voter who believes, for instance, that a mayor has
done a good job paving the streets and running the schools may
vote for the mayor's re-election even if he misspent large sums
of public money attracting a business to the city. It is in this
sense that officials are immune from the consequences of their
decisions, a condition that I suggested above has been linked to
materialization of the Winner's Curse. They cannot easily be
signaled that their actions diverge from what is preferred by
their constituents, and by the time officials' errors are discovered, they are likely to have moved from office.
Indeed, residents themselves may favor projects that turn
out to generate net costs, at least if those costs will not be realized
until some point in the future. To the extent that projects are
financed with debt, current residents may favor projects that
favor immediate returns (construction jobs, increased demand
for housing) over costs that will be imposed only on future generations (excessive demand on city services, obligations to pay
for facilities that turn out to be unnecessary because promised
job and residential growth did not materialize).
Political officials themselves allegedly have a bias in favor
of unchecked business development, regardless of its effects.
Such involvement presumably demonstrates a desire to encourage economic growth and allows the officials to take credit
for economic successes, while eschewing blame for business defections that might otherwise have occurred (even if they were
socially efficient defections). 3 If officials in other jurisdictions
are offering similar programs, mimicking their efforts may appear to be a safer course to deflect allegations of inaction, especially in an environment where measurement of the actual
effects of incentives is problematic." Creating public works
and attracting businesses that construct plants similarly provides officials with concrete and salient evidence of action, and
offers a legacy that is more visible, and hence more enduring,
than programs that do not require capital expenditures.
Hence, it is likely that public officials suffer from an "edifice
complex" that causes them to favor expenditures that attract
capital investment.
43.

See Enrich, supra note 1, at 394 (arguing that politicians will take

visible steps to encourage economic growth and then will take credit for economic gains and avoid blame for economic losses).
44. See id. (stating that it is easier for politicians to follow the lead of
other states in acting to promote economic growth).
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As in the case of the Winner's Curse arguments, these contentions from public choice have a ring of truth, but some
greater disaggregation of their effects is necessary to distinguish those cases in which they are likely to induce overbidding from those cases in which they are not. There is little
doubt that some groups would receive discrete benefits from
business development and thus have substantial incentive to
invest in capturing the official decisionmaking process. The
remaining issue is whether there exist sufficient interests on
the other side so that we could conclude with confidence that
any ultimate decision to grant incentives was made only after
robust debate in which all views were represented. In those
circumstances, we would be more comfortable that the ultimate
decision was likely to reflect officials' best guess as to the net
effects of the incentives.
The arguments presented above suggest that the costs of
collective action will be prohibitive to potential opposition
groups, such as taxpayers who will be charged higher rates or
receive fewer services if incentives allow firms to pay only
benefit taxes. Some opposition groups, however, should be able
to coalesce against proposed subsidies. For instance, existing
firms will face competitive threats from new businesses within
the same industry and will be particularly concerned if those
new firms are granted competitive advantages such as tax45
abatements or tax-exempt financing that reduce their costs.
Thus, we are likely to see coalitions of "mom-and-pop" stores
form to oppose the entry of a Wal-Mart, or of independent book
stores to oppose the entry of a Borders. This type of collective
opposition is obviously most likely to arise where the subsidy
takes the form of a grant to a specific firm, such as a taxabatement extended to a courted firm or the issuance of taxexempt bonds the proceeds of which will be dedicated to the,
construction of a new plant for the firm. 46 A broad program

45. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
FINANCE 49-50 (1992) (arguing that when subsidies are to be given to a new
business, already existing businesses in the same industry who cannot receive

subsidies will participate in the political process to argue that the subsidy
does not generate net social gains).
46. Saul Levmore refers to the possibility of this "conscious funding" to

support a general rationale of why courts are more deferential towards subsidies than to other preferences challenged under the Commerce Clause. See
Levmore, supra note 8, at 485-86 (discussing "conscious funding"). Since subsidies come out of the treasury, "courts might assume that the state legislature has considered the burdens and benefits of its action" in ways that do not
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applicable to a large group of recipients, such as a general
statutory investment-tax credit, is less likely to be sufficiently
salient in its application to a specific firm to overcome traditional collective action problems, even if it subsidizes new competition to existing firms in the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
possibility that competition may exist in some cases suggests a
need to separate those areas in which public choice concerns
are less dramatic.
In addition, there are some groups that may have a sufficiently strong interest in monitoring public officials that they
are likely to discover and complain about inefficient incentives.
First among these are political opponents of incumbents. To
the extent that they can demonstrate that current officials are
"wasting" public funds, they may be able to increase their own
chances of electoral success. A more complicated case exists
with respect to the media. Increased population may translate
into increased circulation, so that publishers have incentives to
support business development.4
Individual reporters, however, may be able to maximize reputation and job prospects
with investigative reporting that, again, points to "wasteful"
expenditures or subsidies. By generating information about
business incentives, news reports may reduce the costs of investigation to the residents as a whole sufficiently to generate
opposition where none would otherwise exist. Thus, these
groups may have sufficient incentives to overcome the general
collective action problem that suggests proponents will have an
unopposed path to the ears of public officials.
Look next at the incentives for voters to ignore costs that
can be imposed on future generations because business incentives are funded through debt. This phenomenon is less likely
to exist where debts constitute general obligations of the juapply to state preferences that are not funded by state government. Id. at
585. I suggest that the expenditure from the treasury is one way of making
the favoritism of a particular firm salient. But it is not the only way. For instance, the issuance of revenue bonds on behalf of a firm will not require a direct expenditure. But the benefit to the firm is as salient as in the case of an
explicit subsidy, and it is the salience of the benefit that creates incentives for
potential competitors of the benefitted firm to participate in the decisionmaking process and thus causes the decisionmaker to consider the costs and
benefits of the subsidy. See also Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the
Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1135 (1988) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of pure subsidies such as tax incentives, grants, or loans);
Regan, supra note 8, at 1194-95 (discussing the advantages of state spending
to attract businesses).
47. See Evans, supra note 42, at 1489 (stating that the media benefits
from population growth).
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risdiction, an increasing phenomenon since Congress restricted
the capacity of jurisdictions to fund industrial development
with revenue bonds.4 8 Because virtually all jurisdictions are
subject to debt limitations, as state and localities bump up
against those limitations, prospective projects compete with
each other for scarce dollars. Debt incurred to fund industrial
development reduces the possibility that debt can be incurred
for road construction, libraries, or schools. If those other potential projects are supported by discrete groups (such as road
building firms, librarians, and teachers' unions), those groups
are likely to scrutinize proposed indebtedness to support industrial development. Homeowners in general may analyze
proposed debt payable from property taxes because increased
tax rates may reduce the sales prices of their homes.
For much the same reason, even nongeneral obligation
bond debt, secured solely by the revenue stream generated by
operation of the business financed with bond proceeds, may
generate scrutiny. For most purposes, current law grants a tax
exemption for the interest on such debt for industrial development purposes only if it fits within a "volume cap" allocated to
each state.49 As long as the total financing for all proposed
projects threatens to exceed the state's volume cap, proponents
of competing projects have incentives to scrutinize or force
scrutiny of business incentives that take the form of tax-exempt
financing because financing those projects risks the accessibility of
these other groups to scarce tax-exempt borrowings.
Of course, not all incentives will be similarly susceptible to
monitoring. Explicit subsidies may be more salient than taxabatements or other tax expenditures, such as exemptions. 0
Ad hoc incentives negotiated with individual companies will be
more salient than statutory incentives that apply to a wide
range of firms. Those subsidies that are more susceptible to
intrajurisdictional political review may require less centralized
intervention. Interestingly, however, that analysis seems to be
lacking in much of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a conclusion that seems consistent with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
recent comment that "[alnalysis of interest group participation
in the political process may serve many useful purposes, but
48. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 141 (1994).
49. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 142-46 (1994); DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE
USE OF TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 287-323 (1991) (discussing the purposes, applications,
advantages, and disadvantages of the "volume cap" as applied to states).
50. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 46, at 1110.
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serving as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce
Clause is not one of them."51 For instance, the form of incentive that seems most likely to generate monitoring, explicit
subsidies to specific firms, may be the form to which courts respond most restrictively.52 In addition, explicit subsidies have
generated the greatest outcry from critics, some of whom contend that congressional intervention is necessary only to prevent subsidies to specific firms while leaving intact state policies that offer the53 same tax breaks to all businesses that locate
within the state.
Finally, even if public officials are susceptible to capture
and thus overinvest in incentives, it is not clear that proposals
for incentives, particularly inefficient ones, will be successfully
implemented. Legal doctrines restrict the capacity of public
officials to engage in particular activities, and the parameters
of these doctrines seem suited to check the possibility that
public officials will grant benefits to a discrete group at the expense of a broader constituency. For instance, the "public purpose" requirement limits the scope of expenditures that can be
made by public officials. Although the definition of "public
purpose" is inherently vague (if not vacuous), courts have applied it to restrict expenditures that appear intended solely to
grant discrete benefits to a group that appears to have captured political decisionmaking processes. Indeed, courts have
taken this action even when they recognized that the jurisdiction
is gaining at the expense of some out-of-state constituency. For
instance, in State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley,54 the court rejected,
on public purpose grounds, revenue bond financing for computer and office facilities. The court recognized that the sole
reason for obtaining public financing was the tax savings
granted by the federal Internal Revenue Code. The costs generated by the federal subsidy on tax-exempt financing would
presumably be shared nationwide, while the benefits of the
program would be localized within South Carolina. One might
imagine that the South Carolina state court, therefore, would

51. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 212 (Rehnquist, C.
J., dissenting).
52. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 584-86 (discussing conscious funding).
53. See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 29, at 3; Thomas J. Holmes, Ana-

lyzing a Proposalto Ban State Tax Breaks to Businesses, FED. RESERVE BANK
MRINEAPOLIS Q. REV., Spring 1995, at 29 (proposing an economic model which

demonstrates that discriminatory tax breaks should be banned).
54. 278 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 1981).
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have welcomed the project, notwithstanding that the transaction appeared to confer substantial benefits on a distinct party,
the developer of the project. Nevertheless, the fact that the
state was attempting to take advantage of a federal subsidy
appears to have been a factor in the decision to find that the
project did not satisfy a public purpose.
The monitoring capacity of courts may be thought to be
limited. After all, courts can only adjudicate disputes brought
before them, and if the collective action problems I have mentioned above discourage parties from initiating costly litigation,
even activist courts will not have opportunities to supervise the
political process. Moreover, even with respect to litigation that
is brought, courts have recently become more deferential to
legislative decisions about what satisfies a public purpose.
Even in South Carolina, courts appear to monitor subsidies of
discrete interests less rigorously than the Riley case suggests.55
Further, it is by no means clear that courts enjoy the institutional competence to distinguish among transactions that actually serve the public interest and those that have been supported because discrete beneficiaries have captured the
political decisionmaking process.56 Nevertheless, the continuing presence of litigation challenging public subsidies does
raise two issues that complicate the public choice story about
subsidies. First, the fact that individuals or groups are willing
to challenge subsidies suggests that the organizational obstacles
to opposition are not insurmountable. Many of the lawsuits
that have arisen in recent years -do not involve those groups
most likely to resist subsidies, such as competitors, but involve,
instead, individual citizens or groups that appear motivated by
concerns about government expenditures generally.5 7 Second,
55. See, e.g., Hucks v. Riley, 357 S.E.2d 458, 459 (S.C. 1987) ("In our
opinion, legislation authorizing the issuance of industrial revenue bonds to
finance the construction of public lodging and restaurant facilities primarily
to foster tourism, the second largest industry in the State, improves the economic welfare of the State, and therefore serves a valid public purpose. Additionally, the facts indicate that the project in this case will serve the public
interest by creating jobs and increasing the tax revenues of both the State and
local governments."); see also Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d
615 (N.C. 1996) (upholding expenditure of tax money for economic development as
a public purpose and distinguishing prior state decisions that rejected similar
programs).
56. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67 (1991) (explaining the shortcomings ofjudicial review).
57. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis.
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the occasional success of these challenges indicates that courts
are not unable or unwilling to intervene in appropriate cases.
For example, in Opinion of the Justices,5 8 the Alabama Supreme Court rejected a plan to subsidize a Mercedes-Benz
plant, the attraction of which had been heralded as a major victory for the state economy. The court concluded that the plan
59
would constitute debt in violation of the state's debt limitation.
Again, my claim here is not that public choice explanations
for political action cannot explain how some business incentives would be granted even though those incentives fail to
generate net benefits for the grantor. Rather, my more modest
claim is that the public choice effects are less pervasive than
the literature to date suggests. Thus, the possibility of systematic biases in favor of negative-sum incentives is less certain than it appears, and should be considered in less sweeping
terms.
C. SUMMARY
To this point, I have suggested that neither the Winner's
Curse nor the public choice explanations for business incentives has theoretical backing as robust as the attack on subsidies assumes. Instead, there exist plausible explanations for
localities to bid for firms, even though the amounts bid initially
appear to invite destructive competition and to constitute
overpayments relative to the value of the attracted firm. Many
of the principles that I have discussed may be illustrated by
considering a common target of locational incentives: the public
financing of sports stadiums. These enterprises come under
attack for all the reasons I have discussed. They are believed
to impose costs on the financing community in excess of the local
economic benefits they generate.6 0 They are considered politically
1996) (exemplifying cases in which a citizens' group has brought suit against
the state); Pike v. Gunyou, 491 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1992); Citizens for More
Important Things v. King County, 932 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1997); CLEAN v.
State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996).
58. 665 So.2d 1357 (Ala. 1995).
59. See also City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Wis. 1993)
(invalidation of tax-increment financing to subsidize commercial facilities in
blighted areas).
60. See, e.g., Robert A. Baade & Richard F. Dye, The Impact of Stadiums
and ProfessionalSports on MetropolitanArea Development, 21 GROWTH AND
CHANGE, Spring 1990, at 2 (explaining how revenue is often insufficient to
cover operating costs); see also ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 245 (1993) (explaining that a
minor-league baseball team's contribution to the local community is relatively
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attractive by officials because a local sports team is salient in
the minds of many voters and owners of sports teams who may
be in a position to assist the campaigns of officials who provide
public subsidies.6 1 Finally, a sports team attracted from one
jurisdiction to another would appear to cause a sense of loss in
the former jurisdiction that offsets any increased civic pride in
the latter jurisdiction. Thus, sports stadium subsidies seem to
be perfect examples of expenditures that suffer from miscalculation of benefits, susceptibility to agency costs, and deadweight losses.
Nevertheless, it is unclear that the case against public
funding of sports stadiums is so strong. From the public choice
perspective, it is noteworthy that lawsuits challenging these
expenditures are quite common, suggesting the presence of an
organized opposition group than can gain access to the decisionmaking process and that is willing to make significant expenditures in its own behalf.62 From the perspective of calculating the economic benefits of a stadium, many of the studies
are inconclusive concerning the effects of the economic activity
that may be induced by the stadium (rather than the direct
benefits at the stadium itself) or the less monetizable benefits
that a stadium might generate, such as psychic benefits that
residents may associate with loyalty to a local major league
team.6 3 At least one study suggests that, looking at major
league baseball revenues alone, stadiums generate substantial
consumer surplus in numerous communities.6r Treating ticket
prices and attendance as measures of consumer surplus, the
study concludes that the net welfare gains of a stadium to the
city range from minus $19.1 million to $32.8 million in the absence of any economic activity that might be attracted by the
small). An analysis of multiple stadium construction projects, concluding that

subsidies sometimes are efficient and sometimes not, can be found in DEAN V.
BAiM, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT (1994).

61. Although this is a common conception, one study suggests that stadium construction has rarely been an issue in mayoral elections. See BAIM,
supra note 60, at 189-90.
62. See cases listed supra note 57. See also Ginsberg v. City and County
of Denver, 486 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1968); Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity,
Inc., 530 A.2d 245 (Mi 1987); Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities
Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1978).
63. See Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in
GOVERNMENT AND SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 327-30 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
64. See Darius Irani, Public Subsidies to Stadiums: Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits?, 25 PUB. FIN. REV. 238, 239 (1997) (explaining that rent
not captured by the sports franchises accrues to the city in the form of net
consumer surplus).
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stadium. The fact that most cities in the study have positive
benefits suggests that public subsidies are not necessarily
overpayments or inconsistent with resident preferences. The
fact that the net benefits vary over a significant range suggests
that different communities will value the same team differently,
so that attracting a team from one locality to another does not
necessarily create a zero-sum result. In short, competition for
sports teams supports the claim that bids may signal the different
values that jurisdictions place on hosting firms generally,
based on residential preferences and the differential earning
capacity that the firm will have in different markets.
II. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN LIMITING COMPETITION
Assume, however, that the intrajurisdictional effects of
business incentives are as problematic as the critique assumes.
It still does not follow that federal intervention to save states
from themselves is warranted. Little in Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests that federal intervention would be appropriate to cure purely intrajurisdictional political defects. Given
65
the Supreme Court's recent restrictive readings of that power,
Congressional intervention must presumably be predicated on
state action that either generates negative externalities or exploits a jurisdiction's monopolistic position. By itself, miscalculating the benefits of business incentives, either as a result of
the limited rationality embodied in the Winner's Curse or the
consequences of capture, does not fall into either of these categories. 66 Thus, the argument for federal intervention must rest
65. See, ag., Printz v. United States, 117 S. CL 2365, 2378 (1997) (invalidating
part of the Brady Act as a violation of the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not
empower Congress to ban gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school).
66. Even in those cases in which courts have approved congressional intervention to solve intrajurisdictional political problems they have found a
relationship between the underlying problem and interstate commerce. In
Blount v. SEC, the court upheld a regulation of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board restricting political contributions by underwriters and
brokers of municipal securities. 61 F.3d 938, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1351 (1996). The regulation was intended to ensure the award of
underwriting contracts on the basis of merit rather than politics, an objective
that one might have thought lay within the exclusive realm of state conflictof-interest law. Nevertheless, the court concluded that there was an obvious
link between maintaining the confidence of the public, and that such contracts
had been awarded on the basis of merit and the Commission's role of perfecting markets and promoting just and equitable principles of trade. The court
noted that state politicians who benefitted from the practice were unlikely to
stop it of their own volition and bond dealers would be unable to initiate re-
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on some basis other than the purely intrajurisdictional effects
of business incentives. That argument, typically phrased in
race-to-the-bottom terms, contends that business incentives
generate net negative effects from the national perspective,
even if they return net benefits to particular localities. Professor Enrich summarizes the argument as follows:
As many participants and spectators have recognized, the incentives
competition is, for the states collectively, at best a zero-sum game.
Even when incentive packages do influence location decisions, the
business that one state attracts is a business that otherwise would
have gone to another state.
From the states' collective vantage point, the net effect of the incentive competition is, in fact, far worse than zero-sum. For, although the states can expect to achieve no overall gain in business
activity or jobs, they do incur a very substantial loss of tax revenues.
Even a tax break that succeeds in attracting a business investment to
a state will represent a net loss for the states collectively, as long as
that investment... would have occurred in some state in the absence
of the incentive. 67

The argument may be strengthened with allegations that
far-reaching incentives, for example, investment tax credits
that are granted to a broad scope of businesses, reduce net
revenues available for public expenditures in that they are also
available to immobile firms already located within the jurisdiction. Thus, at most, incentives constitute wealth transfers
from one jurisdiction to the next or from public treasuries to
private ones, while the transaction costs of effecting those
wealth transfers create a net-negative result. Nevertheless, no
state, aware of the incentive programs offered by other jurisdictions, can escape from the cycle of offering subsidies for fear
that doing so will place it at a competitive disadvantage in the
search for economic development. It is in this sense, as much
as in the sense of intrajurisdictional effects of misjudgment,
that the states must be "saved" from themselves. While in theory
states could agree not to compete for firms, such agreements
usually break under the competitive pressure. 68 The only way
out, according to this argument, is the traditional solution to
prisoner's dilemmas or chicken games: a centralized authority
that is capable of imposing and enforcing a commitment among
the states not to compete.6 9 That, apparently, is the role that
form for fear of retribution from officials who made contract awards.
67. Enrich, supra note 1, at 398-99 (citations omitted).
68. See id. at 397 (describing the circumstances under which agreements
to halt competition have failed).
69. This is essentially the story told in Enrich, supra note 1, at 392-97
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Congress or the courts can exercise through the Commerce
Clause.
The story is more complicated than much of the literature
suggests. I will make three inquiries to press the point: 1) To
what extent should we believe that business incentives induce
a race-to-the-bottom among the states? 2) To what extent is
centralized decisionmaking a necessary solution if the problem
exists? 3) To what extent does use of the Commerce Clause impose additional costs that must themselves be weighed against
the benefits of federal intervention?

A. DOES A RACE TO THE BOTTOM EXIST?
The claim that jurisdictions may use business incentives
in a manner that creates net negative effects from a national
perspective is, of itself, completely plausible. Assume, for instance, that milk producers in State A successfully lobby for a
subsidy that can only be allocated to those producers. Although
cast as an incentive to attract and retain in-state producers,
the effect of the subsidy would include restricting in-state sales
by out-of-state milk producers and artificially increasing milk
prices in State A. Even if milk producers in State A gain from
the program, those gains may be outweighed by the combination
of adverse effects on consumers in State A and out-of-state
milk producers. Thus, if courts were willing and able to examine the effects of individual subsidies, we might expect to see
such a program, which could be characterized either as exploitation of a monopoly within the state or as an action that generated significant negative externalities, invalidated under the
Commerce Clause. °
Alternatively, other incentives might readily be characterized
as generating net negative social effects, even if they return clear
positive returns from the perspective of the offering jurisdiction.
For instance, the tax-exempt status of interest on industrial
revenue bonds may have attracted new business development
to offering states. Even if that business did not simply replace
business that would have existed in other jurisdictions, however, the tax exemption could generate net negative results if
the exemption cost the federal government more that it gained
(outlining the issues involved in enforcing a noncompete commitment among
the states).
70. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)
(exemplifying cases in which this scheme has been found to be unconstitutional).
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the states.7 ' The federal treasury works as a commons in this
situation, with each issuing jurisdiction having an incentive to
"overgraze" because doing so benefits it more than holding
back while others utilize the tax exemption, even if marginal
participation reduces the benefits of participation to the group
as a whole. 72
These examples suggest that business incentives may indeed have the adverse effects attributed to them. There exist
counterexamples, however, in which we do not think that governmental intervention is necessary to prevent downward spiraling competition, and the existence of those cases gives pause
to any effort to speak in broad strokes about the negative effects of incentives. Return, for example, to the partly rhetorical
illustration that I suggested at the outset of the Article. Assume that B State Law School pays professors on a lock-step
scale based on year of graduation from law school. Assume
further that the law school believes that it can enhance its
market position among law schools by building a strong tax
faculty, on the understanding that numerous students are
likely to select among law schools on the strength of tax offerings, and that tax faculty strength will be reflected in the reputation of the school as measured by practitioners and academics. The law school further believes that attracting a wellrespected tax faculty member will create interactions with
other tax faculty and increase both the quality and quantity of
tax publications at the school. Thus, B State Law School offers
Professor A, a renowned tax teacher and scholar at Z Law
School, a position on the faculty, informing her, "If you join our
faculty, our lock-step salary would place you at $x. Nevertheless,
we believe that your addition to the faculty will generate sufficient benefits to us that we are willing to pay you $1.5x." All
the arguments about location subsidies seem to be operating
here. Paying Professor A more than her pre-incentive wage decreases her contribution to other parts of the law school
budget, relative to what is paid by other professors. There are
no assurances that her subsequent productivity will justify the
pay differential. Moreover, bidding her away from Z Law
School is likely (I hope) to start bidding wars among other law
schools for professors and increases in salaries in order to retain
71. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 45, at 430 (discussing the efficiency effects of federal tax exemption on municipal bonds).
72. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal
Bond Proceeds,58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1030, 1052-59 (1983).
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professors. In other words, there would be wealth transfers to
professors without any necessary gain in productivity. Nevertheless, I would be surprised to hear anyone claim that B State
ought to be constrained by the Commerce Clause from bidding
for Professor A's services. Similarly, the omnipresent advertisements for tourism dollars, replete with discounts for travelers, have the potential effect of both distorting vacation decisions and increasing total expenditures for vacations above
what would be advocated by from a national perspective. 73 Finally, statutes that require the state to favor its own residents
in purchasing decisions necessarily disadvantage nonresidents,
but there is at least substantial sentiment for their legitimacy
on the understanding that the state can prefer its own resi74
dents when spending money it receives from those residents.
What distinguishes these cases from those in which we believe there is greater reason for intervention? It is not clear
that there is a single theory that can reconcile all the situations.
In-state preferences may be justified in part because the funds
expended came from tax moneys received from the beneficiaries;
but that rationale has less application to our law professor
case. Preferences may also reflect a somewhat general notion,
explicit in the literature relating to subsidies in international
trade law, that there are certain "legitimate" comparative advantages enjoyed by nations that justify subsidies and that do
not trigger the imposition of countervailing duties.71 Some
commentators have suggested that a combination of tradition
73. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 577 (explaining how some actions, such
as those promoting tourism, are permitted even though their results may be
contrary to national interests).
74. See Benjamin C. Bair, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More
Substantive Application of the Market-ParticipantException, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2408, 2422 (1995). But see W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d
486, 498-549 (7th Cir. 1984) (invalidating state-preference law that mandated
local governments to favor firms that hire state residents for construction
projects). The Third Circuit rejected the reasoning of W.C.M. Window Co. in
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania. 916 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. Denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991). The Ninth Circuit followed in Big Country
Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ. 952 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit has subsequently upheld local-preference laws for contracts involving expenditures of the locality's own fimds. See J.F. Shea Co. v. City of
Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1993) (exemplifying cases in which preference laws have been upheld).
75. See David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes:An Analysis of
Harmonization Claims, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 72 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
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and redistributive interests can justify what might otherwise
be considered an interference with commerce. 6 The argument
that I wish to make with respect to business incentives, however, ties the acceptability of those forms of subsidy to the
function of the Commerce Clause as a means of ensuring economic union." At the very least, incentives seem to be not only
appropriate, but consistent with the federalizing bargain implicit in the Commerce Clause if they satisfy this last objective.
If there is any substance to what Professor Heinzerling has
called the "ritual quotation" 7 8 in Commerce Clause cases of
Justice Jackson's pronouncement that "our economic unit is
the Nation,"79 it must mean more than allowing free trade
among the states. An economic union would instead evaluate
actions undertaken by individual states by reference to their
effects upon the union as a whole, rather than on the acting
state alone. That objective is explicitly involved in the standard Supreme Court doctrine for evaluating nondiscriminatory
laws that have an effect on interstate commerce. That doctrine
provides that such laws are approved only if a court finds that,
from a national perspective, their benefits exceed their burdens." Thus, the Commerce Clause should tolerate state policies that benefit the union as a whole, even though the effect is
to reduce wealth in some subset. If this reduction results from
the loss of a firm that migrates to a jurisdiction where it can be
more productive, rather than from the use of anticompetitive

76. See Gergen, supra note 46, at 1132-37 (explaining some justifications
for interfering with the flow of commerce).
77. See id.
78. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
217, 227.
79. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1940).
80. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.") (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960)). Notwithstanding this formula, Donald Regan has argued
that the Supreme Court has not been involved in balancing, and Lisa
Heinzerling has questioned the capacity of courts to engage in balancing even
if they desired to do so. See Regan, supra note 8, at 1092; Heinzerling, supra
note 78, at 247-51. At best, the test involves an odd sort of balancing insofar
as external costs are considered, but external benefits are not. See Daniel A.
Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 395, 398 (1986). Concentrating on external burdens, however, emphasizes that any calculus must consider national effects on a state's policies.
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devices such as duties or requirements of in-state processing,"
then the objectives of union seem to be enhanced, rather than
frustrated, by subsidies that facilitate that move. The result is
the economic equivalent to measures that seem to be clearly
consistent with practices that are acceptable under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding that they interfere with free
flow of goods, because the effects are so likely to create net social gains from a national perspective. Even if we are skeptical
that courts can make highly tailored inquiries into the costs
and benefits of individual programs, we might take a categorical approach to the Commerce Clause and approve or disapprove of state policies depending on whether the category of
regulation into which they are placed tends to enhance or diminish national wealth. Mark Gergen, for instance, suggests
that permissible embargoes on infected goods can be defended
largely as a means for providing a net social benefit by preventing the spread of disease.82 On the other hand, the most obvious illegitimate restrictions on the flow of goods in commerce,
for example, tariffs, seem unlikely to be welfare-enhancing from a
national perspective and thus are virtually per se invalid.
This analytical structure suggests why we have little objection to B State Law School's efforts to raid other faculties. If
the school is correct in its assumptions about what would attract more students and enhance its reputation, it is simply responding to market demand in structuring its incentive package to Professor A. It has presumably calculated that it can
create a market niche for itself in tax-law education and is
taking those steps necessary to implement its vision. Creating
a strong tax faculty for itself, however, is not necessarily zerosum with the losses imposed on raided schools, since concentrating a community of tax scholars on one faculty may create
a more productive environment than those same professors
would if they were spread among multiple schools. There is
nothing inexorable about this conclusion; it might be, for instance, that diffusely situated tax professors would be more
productive because they would be more likely to interact with
professors from other substantive areas and would be introduced to novel concepts that would not be recognized by tax
professors simply talking among themselves. There is, however,
81. See, e.g., C. & A. Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386
(1994) (finding that a similar arrangement involving solid-waste processing
was unconstitutional).
82. See Gergen, supra note 46, at 1110.
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nothing inherently unproductive about a school attempting the
strategy of.building specialties and trying to create a fit between itself and professors in that specialty, and there is a
plausible chance that both the school and the legal academy
will be better off as a result. Simultaneously, nothing precludes other law schools from taking similar measures to bid
away tax professors or from developing other specialties that
would entail raiding other law schools. Indeed, if B State Law
School is successful, we would expect other law schools to adopt
its strategy. Nor does it prevent other schools from attracting
the same professor by demonstrating that the fit between that
person and the school is better than at any alternative.
The analogy to attracting industries should be clear. If
national wealth enhancement was a primary objective of the
federalizing bargain, then efforts to increase the size of the social
pie, by matching firms with their most productive jurisdiction,
is not inconsistent with that bargain. To the contrary, it is entirely consistent as long as those economies, once realized, are
available to all. Policies that have this purpose or effect are
qualitatively different from a statutory scheme that merely
transfers wealth or that creates an artificial monopoly that
frustrates transactions that would otherwise occur. Contrast,
for instance, an effort by Illinois to compel in-state utilities to
use coal mined 83in the state rather than lower-sulphur coal
mined elsewhere. The restrictions on using out of state products
in that case 84 simply interfered with competitive markets that
we anticipate will allocate goods to their highest valued use.
In the place of markets, the state simply exploited its own monopoly over higher sulphur coal in a manner that would increase its own wealth, but only at a cost imposed on others (its
citizens, low sulphur coal producers, and those who value
tradeoffs between financial costs and the environment that
would have favored non-Illinois coal). Even if we accepted a
balancing test for evaluating statutory constraints on commerce, it seems implausible that the benefits to be realized by
83. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 595-96 (7th Cir.
1995) (striking down the Illinois Coal Act as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause).
84. The state law required large utilities to install scrubbers so they could
continue to use Illinois coal and required approval by the state's Commerce
Commission for any 10% or greater decrease in the use of Illinois coal by a
utility. See id. at 594-95. The law also permitted utilities to pass the compliance costs of scrubbers into the rate base, even though cheaper alternatives
may have been available. See 1d. at 595-96.
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Illinois would either outweigh those costs or would be shared
with other jurisdictions. Instead, the statute looks too much
like exploitation of a domestic monopoly, preservation of which
seems inconsistent with the federalizing bargain.
Perhaps the likelihood that a particular scheme will create
net social benefits by matching producers and jurisdictions or
by encouraging entrepreneurship informs our intuitions about
those situations that offend the Commerce Clause and those
that do not. Think, for instance, of Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Commission.8 5 In that case, the Court invalidated a
New York statute that imposed a higher transfer tax on securities
transactions involving out-of-state sales than transactions involving intrastate sales. The explicit objective of the distinction
was to encourage securities trades to be effected in New York
in the face of competition from out-of-state exchanges. 86 The
Court held that this effort to reduce out-of-state competition
with an in-state business invalidly discriminated against interstate commerce. Doctrinally, the rationale of the Court centered on the allegation that "[p]ermitting the individual States
to enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of
out-of-state businesses 'would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free trade which the
Clause protects."87 Such a doctrine, however, does little to distinguish express subsidies from the ones implicit in New York's
preferential tax. Local companies that receive subsidies in the
form of low-interest loans, tax-abatements, or tax credits enjoy
a competitive advantage over firms in the same industry in
other jurisdictions if those companies do not receive similar
subsidies in their jurisdictions.
There may be a rationale behind the doctrine, however,
that permits a more principled distinction. I have suggested
above that locational subsidies may be viewed as signals of
comparative advantage or as bonding mechanisms. Each of
these strategies can solve an informational asymmetry- which
could interfere with firms locating in the jurisdiction where
they will be most productive. The Court in Boston Stock Exchange intimated that strategies directed at this objective were
consistent with the Commerce Clause when it concluded that
the offensive element of the New York tax was that it caused

85.
86.
87.

429 U.S. 318 (1977).
See id. at 327-28.
Id. at 329 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,356 (1951)).
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"the flow of securities sales [to be] diverted from the most eco-

nomically efficient channels and directed to New York." 8 A
firm already located in a jurisdiction is less likely to suffer
from an informational asymmetry about the benefits of that location. Firms already located in New York are likely to be
aware of any synergies that New York offers. In addition, their
presence will likely be a sufficient signal of an appropriate focal point to attract other firms that would benefit from geographical proximity. It is conceivable that in some situations,
attracting additional firms that would benefit from network externalities could be facilitated by a subsidy; for instance, the
jurisdiction might contain some, but less than a critical mass of
firms necessary to realize network benefits. But that explanation
certainly does not fit the location of securities firms in New
York. Instead, the tax differential in that case appears to be a
means of preserving an existing monopoly, even if there is no
reason to believe that doing so will generate a surplus over
what would exist if the same services were performed elsewhere. A statute that subsidizes an existing industry therefore
looks presumptively like one that is intended to serve the
prominence of that industry within the state rather than an effort to increase the social pie. That strategy would offend the
federalizing bargain because it only effects a transfer of wealth
from one jurisdiction to another rather than an increase in the
amount of wealth available for distribution throughout the nation.
Efforts to attract business (or to create market niches
among law schools), therefore, may, but need not, serve a sorting
function that enhances, rather than frustrates, federalism objectives. Even if bidding wars begin among law schools, they
may generate greater, not less, social welfare if they lead to
sorting among law schools that develop specialties, among law
students who seek training in those specialties, and among
faculty with different preferences for academic environments
(commercial law professors who want to write theoretical articles are attracted to School C, while those who want to write
black letter law articles are attracted to School Y). The result
should be the very type of efficient satisfaction of preferences
that we think at least partially underlies federalist structures. 89 Unlike a state that attempts to exploit others by tax88. Id. at 336. The Court continued. "This diversion of interstate commerce
and diminution of free competition in securities sales are wholly inconsistent
with the free trade purpose of the Commerce Clause." Id.
89. See Michael McConnell, Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,
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big resources over which it has a monopoly, 0 or attempts to
frustrate competition for services already located within its
boundaries, 91 a state that sought to attract credit-card issuers
by eliminating usury rates, or that enacted corporate law attractive to corporate boards may be less likely to be exploiting,
rather than creating an advantage equally open to other
states.92 From this perspective, the evidence that business incentives do not dramatically alter the locational preferences of
businesses93 is not necessarily bad news. If these incentives
had a major impact on locational decisions, we might believe
that the amounts offered were sufficiently great to induce firms
away from locations where they would be most productive, that
is, that the subsidies offset at least short-run profits that the
firms would receive from locating elsewhere. If firms are using
subsidies as tie-breakers or as a second-level basis of making a
decision after first narrowing the field to areas in which other
factors suggested high profitability, however, then there may
be a greater likelihood that the local preferences for the firm
will coincide with national interests in siting in the most productive jurisdiction.
Even if the distinction I have tried to draw is valid as a
theoretical matter, it is open to the criticism that it is based on
54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (arguing the framers believed a decentralized decisionmaking structure would best meet the needs of a diverse
population).
90. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 619, 636-37
(1981) (upholding Montana Coal Severance Tax despite its heavy burden on
out-of-state utility companies).
91. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Coimn'n., 429 U.S. 318, 319
(1977) (describing New York's tax on securities transactions, which burdened
out-of-state sales more than in-state sales).
92. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 570-75 (drawing a distinction between
"exploitation" of, and mere "interference" with interstate commercial activities).
Some commentators, however, suggest that competition for corporations does
create a race-to-the-bottom in corporate law doctrine, transferring wealth
from shareholders. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalismand the Corporation: The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1437 (1992) (advocating heightened federal regulation of charter competition by comparing it to corporate contractual freedom); William L. Cary,
Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974) (decrying as destructive and inappropriate attempts by Delaware to
attract corporate citizens). But see Frank L Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion
and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984)
(suggesting that increased government regulation of management may be unnecessary because market forces may provide sufficient incentives to protect
the interests of investors).
93. See Enrich, supra note 1, at 390-92 (citing studies which suggest that
fiscal incentives do little to alter business location decisions).
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rather heroic assumptions that, as a practical matter; jurisdictions do compete in ways that indicate their relative productivity and preferences. To the extent that states are involved in
competition for industry, but make rational judgments about
tradeoffs between attracting business and the costs related to
that activity, no race to the bottom will exist. Instead, each
state will simply engage in the competition up to the point
when the marginal benefits of additional industry no longer
exceed the marginal costs.9 4 On the other hand, if those who
win contests for firms are simply trying to maximize jobs or
revenues without attention to fit with courted firms or the
preferences of constituents, then the presumption that bids
solve information asymmetries or constitute appropriate signaling and bonding devices is less warranted. Instead, we
would be more likely to have the naked contest for firms that
underlies the race-to-the-bottom argument.
Some commentators find evidence that no such rational
race occurs in the fact that all states participate in the competition, as evidenced by the legal authority that states have
granted to themselves or to their political subdivisions to grant
business incentives.95 However, the fact that all states have
authorized such activities does not mean that they use that
authorization equally or that they use it without regard to the
costs that such incentives generate. The race-to-the-bottom
claim depends not on the possibility that states would compete
destructively, but that they are induced to do so by rational
self-interest because unilateral nonparticipation leaves them
worse off. There is, however, at least some evidence that states
select how much and when to spend on economic development
programs independent of the activities of other states. If states
are caught in a race, we might expect to see states spending
equivalent amounts per capita or as a percentage of their
budget. Substantial variations in these figures would be more

94. For an elaboration of these conditions in the context of a race-to-thebottom in environmental regulation, see generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2341
(1996) [hereinafter Revesz, Federalism & Externalities] (arguing that federal
environmental laws inadequately redress the problem of interstate externalities); Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition:Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that race-to-the-bottom theories are empirically weak and do not logically necessitate federal environmental legislation).
95. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 1, at 390-92 (discussing business incentives).
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consistent with the claim that states were seeking an optimal
amount of business development, as predicted by the claim
that competition among states was less a war of attrition than
a contest among competitors from which each could withdraw
when it achieved an independently defined objective.
Paul Peterson has examined expenditures by each state's
government and local government paid from their own resources for economic development and determined the coefficient of variation in different years.9 6 The coefficient of variation measures the extent to which states differ from one
another on any particular characteristic. The higher the coefficient of variation, the greater the diversity among the states
on the characteristic being measured. Thus, Peterson reports
that [e]ven a coefficient of 0.33 indicates substantial variation
among the states."97 Peterson concluded that the "amount that
state governments and the localities within them spent per
capita on developmental programs varied markedly among the
states."98 Looking at five year intervals from 1967 to 1987, the
coefficient of variation ranged from .31 to .57, although it decreased from .50 in 1987 to .34 in 1991. Even that last figure,
however, demonstrates that a third of the states differ from the
average state by about one-third the expenditure in the average state. Note that the coefficient of variation would not vary
if all states were increasing or decreasing their expenditures
on economic development at the same rate. Thus, the variation
among the states seems to be a feature of conscious and independent decisions by some states to favor significantly more
spending than others on economic development, rather than a
consequence of practical coercion induced by the policies of others.
This is not to say, of course, that states will not make expenditures
to protect their interests in existing industries or to attract
others. The expenditures of some states on business incentives
are undoubtedly higher than they would be if other states did
not similarly have incentive programs to lure businesses away.
It is simply to say that the expenditures made for this purpose
may be dictated by normal practices that generate efficient
sorting among competitors to achieve optimal size or to take
advantage of the fit between particular businesses and the

96. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 87-89 (1995).
97. Id. at 87.
98. Id. at 88.
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business programs developed by an individual state rather
than a destructive race to the bottom.
Nor is this to say that even if locations are predicated on
synergies between firms and states that signal (through use of
incentives) their willingness to accommodate certain industries, that no redistributional consequences follow. As long as
mobile firms can take advantage of incentives in ways that
immobile firms cannot, the use of subsidies and abatements
will cause either a shift of tax burden for nonbenefit charges to
the immobile or a decrease in services within the jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, if those who bear a greater burden do, in fact,
believe that they enjoy net benefits from attracting or retaining
the mobile businesses on which they depend, then they may be
willing to accept some redistribution as the price of achieving
those benefits.
The highly tailored subsidies that some jurisdictions employ may support this data. The fact that different states appear to court different firms or industries suggests that some
matching is occurring. When a jurisdiction favors a particular
industry, it can be difficult to know whether that industry has
been courted because the state is engaged in matching or
whether representatives of that industry have simply captured
the legislature. The specificity of some programs seems to indicate the latter. When we see state-supported programs directed expressly at such ventures as "promoting the planting of
99
grain crops and the development of a substitute for gasoline,"
or cold flusion, 10° our instinct may be to think in terms of interest group dominance. Legislators may believe, however, that
their support for particular firms or industries simply places
them ahead of the curve, so that they have a competitive advantage over other jurisdictions. Even where subsidies are offered at the behest of particular firms or industries, legislators
may be convinced by the claims that those subsidies will generate
local wealth, and thus are not simply engaged in rent-seeking
donations of the public treasury. 10 1
99. State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612, 615 (S.C. 1981) (quoting
the South Carolina General Assembly's finding as to the effect of a targeted
bond issuance statute).
100. See Utah OKs Cold-Fusion Research Funds, THE SACRAMENTO BEE,
August 1, 1989, at A6.
101. Note, for instance, that Utah's support for cold fusion deteriorated
when the project failed to produce results. If the subsidies for the project
were simply generated by capture, then one would have anticipated that they
would have continued even without successful results, whereas one would
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Finally, note that the race-to-the-bottom argument assumes
that locational decisions of courted firms have no positive national
wealth effects because the firm is limited to choices between
State A and State B. In the current open economy, incentives
offered by State A may prevent plants from locating in another
country, rather than in another jurisdiction in this country. 2
Alternatively, incentives may attract plants from another
country that would otherwise have located in their home jurisdiction or in some third nation. Indeed, the fear that nations will
engage in tactics that generate a race-to-the-bottom from an international perspective provides at least the theoretical justification for GATT Subsidy rules. 10 3 The possibility that high labor
costs in the United States will induce exporting of jobs suggests that, absent fear of retaliation by other countries, there is
less reason for the federal government to impede states from
retaining or attracting these same firms.
B. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
If we now understand that 1) states may or may not be
miscalculating benefits of attracting plants, but that there is
little reason to believe that miscalculation is systemic; 2) states
may be involved in a race to the bottom, but may be involved in
sorting preferences along the lines desired for jurisdictional
competition; and 3) localized interests opposed to subsidies can
be represented in local decisions concerning subsidies, then one
must be skeptical of congressional or judicial intervention that
sweeps broadly to prohibit business incentives. Any prohibition
on these practices may be counterproductive and unnecessary
to achieve the economic union envisioned by the Commerce
Clause. At the same time, the possibility that occasional uses
of incentives may create net losses suggests that case-by-case
adjudication of the conditions and consequences of any particular
incentive program is an appropriate mechanism to check the
risks that the Commerce Clause is intended to avoid. This is a
position that the Supreme Court has thus far rejected, opting
instead for broad protection of formal subsidies granted by
predict that the subsidies would be eliminated if expected gains in employment
or revenues did not materialize.
102. See Netzer, supra note 12, at 226 (pointing out the potential worldwide effects of state economic development efforts).
103. For a skeptical view of the accuracy of race-to-the-bottom logic in international trade and in government regulation generally, see Alvin Y,
Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the
World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 177 (1996).
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states acting as "market participants." °4 Notwithstanding the
difficulties in distinguishing the economic effects of permitted
subsidies from prohibited trade barriers,105 bidding for firms
constitutes the kind of purchase that the Court has immunized
from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Bidders are essentially attempting to "purchase" the location of the firm, and the Court
has made clear since Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. that
the state's conduct "as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce [the location]" does not create a
burden upon commerce.10 6 Like the abandoned cars at issue in
Hughes, firms that are attracted to a state by incentives respond "to market forces, including that exerted by money from
the State."10 7 In this Part, I suggest that deviating from this
categorical treatment in favor of ad hoc adjudication of particular
subsidies injects courts into areas where we would anticipate
high levels of judicial error.
One point on which commentators agree is that our Commerce Clause jurisprudence is confused.108 There is general
agreement on the objectives that the Clause seeks to serve,
typically phrased in terms of creating a "national market,"10 9 or
preventing one jurisdiction from discriminating against another.'
Application of the doctrine, however, has proven more
104. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 794 (1976). The
Court has expressed similar sentiments in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 879 (1985) (noting "a State's goal
of bringing in new business is legitimate and often admirable"); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 ("A pure subsidy fimded out of
general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but
merely assists local business.").
105. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 210-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (attempting to distinguish between discriminatory "refunds of' and
"exempting" from nondiscriminatory taxes).
106. 426 U.S. at 808.
107. Id. at 810.
108. See, e.g., Revesz, Federalism & Externalities, supra note 94, at 2398
(noting "[tihere is widespread agreement that doctrinal confusion surrounds
the Dormant Commerce Clause"); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the
American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE 9, 47 (A. Tarlock ed., 1981) (pointing out the apparent lack of any

consistent rationale in the Supreme Court's modern dormant Commerce

Clause cases).
109. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(declaring that the negative Commerce Clause forbids "any state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce").
110. See Enrich, supra note 1, at 424-33 (analyzing case law which con-

strues the dormant Commerce Clause as an "antidiscrimination" provision).
But see Regan, supra note 8, at 1137, 1143-45 (advocating the more limited
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problematic. Policies with equivalent economic effects have
generated quite different legal results, leading Professors
Hellerstein and Coenen to inquire whether pure distinctions
among form constitute an appropriate basis for differences in
legal effect."' Even advocates of federal constraints on incentives understand that courts have demonstrated little facility
with making the highly contextualized review of state programs that ad hoc adjudication requires. Thus, Professor En112
rich refers to Commerce Clause jurisprudence as "tortured,"
13
and "never... a model of consistency,"' and its embodiment
in an antidiscrimination standard as "clumsy."" 4 He suggests
that an "antidistortion" standard may prove more workable
and consistent with the objectives of the Commerce Clause. I
have suggested, to the contrary, that distortion may be exactly
what we desire, because distorting location decisions may actually enhance efficiency from a national perspective. More to
the current point, Professor Enrich's suggestion that all we
need is a different or more refined standard reveals a faith in
the capacity for judicial distinctions for which his own analysis
of traditional dormant Commerce Clause cases provides little
support. If high levels of judicial error are inevitable in making
the distinctions such analysis would require, it might be best
not to start down that road in the first place.
There is little reason to believe that courts would have an
easier time administering the validity or propriety of a particular
subsidy. Courts are simply not equipped to undertake the
analysis necessary to determine whether a particular subsidy
is likely to generate benefits in excess of its costs. If one criticism of such subsidies is that political officials are unable after
substantial study to forecast with accuracy the extent to which
attracting firms will generate additional jobs and revenue for
one jurisdiction, it is difficult to perceive how courts would be
able to discern whether any specific incentive program would
generate net gains from a national perspective. One might respond that judicial analysis is never perfect, but that the risks
inherent in subsidies make judicial intervention worthwhile.
After all, one might contend, the cacophony of dormant Coinobjective of preventing only "purposeful" protectionism).
111. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 1, at 794-824 (surveying recent
Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause decisions).
112. Enrich, supra note 1, at 460.
113. Id. at 462.
114. Id. at 453.
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merce Clause decisions has not generated substantial claims
that the courts should stay out of that business. 115 I want to
suggest, however, that even if there exists a rationale for intervention in other Commerce Clause cases, judicial review of locational incentives warrants little more than the categorical
approval that the Supreme Court has heretofore applied to
subsidies generally. If my argument is correct, then blanket
approval of incentives would avoid the doctrinal confusion and
costs of judicial error (approving inefficient subsidies and invalidating efficient ones) without incurring substantial risks of
destructive interstate competition. This would be so because
there will be some natural tendency for such programs to return
net benefits, and there exist nonjudicial institutions capable of
preventing the use of negative-sum business incentives. This
possibility distinguishes business incentives from other activities that allegedly run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause,
but that may be more susceptible to judicial review and not
easily reviewed by other institutions.
The first reason to distinguish business incentives stems
from the characteristics of more traditional dormant Commerce
Clause cases. The typical cases in this area concern somewhat
idiosyncratic facts and (from a national perspective) small
stakes.1 6 Mudflaps, milk levies, and liquor exemptions do not
easily fall within the same general classification. They instead
represent efforts by particular jurisdictions to act in a protectionist manner with respect to those industries in which they
have a monopoly or a strong vested interest. The result is that
any proposed ex ante prohibition would have to be drafted so
broadly that it would do little more than recite explicitly the
implicit constitutional restriction on state regulation of commerce, or so narrowly that it would be unlikely to generate sufficient support in a national forum. Congress is unlikely to devote
attention to what are essentially parochial concerns directed
against the conduct of individual states. 1 17 The idiosyncratic
115. But see Kitch, supra note 108, at 46-47 (predicting that the Supreme
Coures dormant Commerce Clause methodology will produce results that are
"confused, limited, and of small importance"); Heinzerling, supra note 78, at
223 (advocating outright abandonment of the antidiscrimination principle).
Professor Farber, who doubts the courts' capacity to balance effectively, does
advocate a more limited role in which courts intervene only when an intent to
discriminate against interstate commerce can be established. See Farber, supra note 80, at 414.
116. See Farber, supra note 80, at 413.
117. See Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurterand the
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nature and effects of individual state protectionist statutes
similarly makes state policies that would cause harm in other
jurisdictions less susceptible to agreements with other jurisdictions. Thus, if state practices that contravene the dormant
Commerce Clause are to be prohibited, the courts must do the
prohibiting.
The more generic nature of locational incentives leaves
them more open to congressional regulation. Congress theoretically could speak in terms of tax-abatement programs, investmenttax credits, use of tax-exempt bond proceeds, or state grants
and thereby regulate large numbers of state incentive programs. The similarity among these programs, however, simultaneously facilitates implicit or explicit agreements among
states. The possibility of the latter makes a centralized regulatory
approach less necessary. As indicated above, the call for federal
intervention is based on the traditional response to the prisoner's
dilemma that involves creating of a centralized overseer. Prisoner's
dilemmas, however, are famously susceptible to alternative
solutions where the players engage in repeat play and thus defectors are vulnerable to retaliation. That solution consists
simply of acting cooperatively, at least until other players defect, because mutual cooperation produces higher payoffs than
defection where each player has an opportunity to impose costs
on the other in subsequent iterations of the game." 8 States
that are geographically locked in to dealing with each other
and that have constant interactions with each other in various
fora (Congress, meetings of state officials, etc.) may have substantial opportunities to retaliate should one of their number
act opportunistically. In a system composed of fifty states located over thousands of miles, interactions among some are
likely to be greater than interactions with others. Ohio and
Michigan may be more prone to cooperate than Arizona and
Michigan. The very geographical distance between Arizona
and Michigan that frustrates agreements, however, may simultaneously signal that when the former induces relocation from
the latter, it is not simply engaged in a zero-sum competition,
but is appealing to very real differences between the jurisdictions
and that those differences truly generate net benefits from the
Position of the Judiciary,67 YALE L.J. 219, 222 (1957); Jesse H. Ohoper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1586 (1977); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 435 (1982).
118. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION 109-23

(1984) (describing methods of escape from the prisoner's dilemma).
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Thus, it is conceivable that when
national perspective.
(implicit or explicit) agreements are not reached, or when
agreements are breached," 9 the reason lies in a significant advantage that one of the players enjoys and that increases welfare.
The prisoner's dilemma model creates a powerful basis for
believing that states will not enter into a destructive race to
the bottom as long as other states can impose costs on them,
and that federal intervention is thus superfluous. Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be suspicious of the iterated or
repeat-play prisoner's dilemma model as a solution to interstate competition. The first arises from the public choice
problem. The constraining effects of retaliatory possibilities
diminish as players approach the end of their relationship and
the capacity for reprisal is reduced. While it is unlikely that
this "endgame" problem will arise among geographically
proximate states, it is highly likely to arise among the politicians through whom the states act. The governor of Michigan
may prefer to obtain the short-term benefits of attracting firms
from Ohio if he anticipates that any retaliation will take effect
only after he leaves office. Of course, if constituents have a
time horizon beyond the next election, they may prefer officials
who do not engage in behavior that returns only short-term
rewards, but it is at least plausible that repeat-play models
will not be as effective as I have suggested.
The second limitation on iterated prisoner's dilemma as a
solution to inefficient competition arises from the fact that
there may be more than one equilibrium in a repeated game.
Recall that what sustains the practice of cooperation in an iterated prisoner's dilemma is the fact that the expected value of
continued cooperation exceeds the expected value of defection
(because retaliation will impose expected losses in excess of
those expected benefits of short-term defection). It may be,
however, that one player's expected payoff from continued cooperation still exceeds the payoff from defection, even though
the other party is not cooperating. Assume, for instance, that
119. Professor Enrich suggests that efforts at cooperation have failed. See
Enrich, supra note 1, at 397 (noting that several state agreements have succumbed to business pressures). It is difficult to know whether the instances
he cites represent a glass that is half-empty or half-full. The fact that agreements are reached lends some support for my claim. The implications of the
fact that they are breached depends on whether the breach results in the race
that Professor Enrich predicts or location to more productive jurisdictions.
See id. at 397-405 (characterizing the effects of competitive state tax incentives as negative).
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Michigan announces that it is actively seeking to induce industry from Ohio, but is only looking to attract three firms. Michigan also announces, however, that if Ohio attempts to retaliate
by attracting Michigan firms, Michigan will seek to attract
every Ohio firm it can. If Ohio believes these statements, and
also believes that the payoff from continued cooperation even
after the loss of a few firms exceeds the payoff from continued
battles with Michigan for many firms, it may simply accept
some short-term losses but not retaliate. Repeat prisoner's dilemma does not, in these circumstances, require mutual cooperation; it only makes cooperation one of several plausible
strategies.12 0 Nevertheless, the possibility that the prisoner's
dilemma among states will tend to generate cooperation when
long-term benefits are anticipated suggests a set of circumstances in which the feared race to the bottom should not materialize.
There is a second reason why judicial intervention is less
attractive in subsidy cases than in other dormant Commerce
Clause cases. If I am correct that certain forms of subsidies
(for instance, explicit ones to particular firms) will trigger participation by a significant group of advocates and opponents,
then the decision to pursue the firm may more credibly be
thought to reflect both positive value for the bidding jurisdiction,
and perhaps a value that cannot easily be replicated elsewhere.
Again, the point here is concerned with the salient nature of
subsidies directed at particular firms. The difference between
payments from the treasury and tax expenditures or protectionist legislation is that there is a discrete set of residentspotential competitors of the favored firm or competitors for the
scarce subsidy dollars-who can identify themselves as vulnerable to injury by the governmental action and are capable of
seeking redress. The result is that we would expect a fuller
debate within the bidding jurisdiction about the propriety of
the proposed action. Even if this argument reveals too much
faith in the coincidence of local and national interests (because
net local gains do not necessarily translate into net national
gains), at the very least it suggests that one of the major justifications for the antidiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause is less readily applicable to business incentives. Dis120. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POsITIVE POLITIcAL ECONOMY 90, 100-103 (James E. Alt &
Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (explaining that participants in on-going bargaining are repeatedly free to make choices about trust and honor).
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criminatory regulations run afoul of the Commerce Clause in
part because those who would be adversely affected are not
represented in the decisionmaking process of the regulating
Because the regulating state internalizes the
jurisdiction.'
benefits and externalizes the costs, some national arbiter (and
a federal court qualifies) is necessary to prevent regulations
that are negative-sum from the national perspective. 2 2 On the
other hand, if local opponents can be expected to arise, one
would anticipate that they would make the arguments of, and
therefore serve as effective surrogates for, those unrepresented
in the decisionmaking process.
This is not to say that the arguments of in-state surrogates
for out-of-state interests would be dispositive. After all, a state
may still enact an incentive program that it believes will return positive benefits in-state, even though the state realizes
that the program imposes externalities that render it net
negative from the national perspective. The risks of underrepresentation, however, must be balanced against the costs
that would be incurred by any judicially created or legislatively
imposed standard that leaves substantial discretion to courts in
an area where history predicts substantial judicial uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
The argument that I have made suggests a utilitarian approach to the dormant Commerce Clause. Interpreted most
broadly, this perspective holds that subsidies do not run afoul

121. See Heinzerling, supra note 78, at 220-21 (arguing against a processbased theory as a justification for the antidiscrimination doctrine). Professor
Heinzerling has warned against making too much of political participation
arguments in this context because even non-residents may lobby or otherwise
participate in political processes. See id. at 251-56. Nevertheless, they may
have limited capacity to participate relative to residents, and legislators may
be wary of claims that they are catering to "foreign" interests. For a still more
skeptical view of process justifications for judicial review of legislation alleged
to violate the Commerce Clause, see Regan, supra note 8, at 1160-67
(disputing the "CaroleneProducts theory" of the dormant Commerce Clause).
122. The focus on costs of regulation to outsiders not represented in the
decisionmaking process is an important feature of the analysis in Eule, supra
note 117, at 425. Of course, it may be that in-state residents are also adversely affected by the regulation. As I noted above, if in-state milk producers
obtain a subsidy not available to out-of-state producers, the artificially increased prices for milk that results will adversely affect in-state consumers.
Traditional-collective action problems among a diffuse population composed of
individuals with a small stake in the outcome of the political debate explains
why milk producers may still be able to dominate decisionmaking.
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of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine if, as a whole, they tend
to induce firms to locate in jurisdictions that permit greater
productivity than the same firms would achieve in other jurisdictions. The test, then, reflects the decisions that would be
made by a single legislator acting in the national interest without regard to the interests of individual states, and taking into
account the costs of decisionmaking that preclude highly individualized analyses of the effects of particular subsidies. I do
not think that this test necessarily entails balancing in all its
implications. There may be conditions in which we would want
to preserve the interests and identities of states sufficiently
that we would not want to allow some to extract wealth from
others, even if the nation as a whole benefited. This would especially be the case if it turned out that the same region was
consistently bearing the burden necessary to generate benefits
for others. Subsidies, however, do not create those difficulties.
All states can enter the competition, so that exploitation of
monopoly positions is less likely. Of course, the fact that all
states can compete is what underlies the claims that they will
race to the bottom of the economic ladder. But because different states are likely to compete for different firms, it is unlikely
that the same jurisdictions will systematically be winners and
losers.
If I am correct that interstate competition will cause firms
to be more productive, or will cause states to attract firms that
confer benefits in excess of the benefits that would be conferred
on alternative jurisdictions, our reaction to business incentives
tests our choice between relatively harmonious and competitive
economic policies for individual states. This choice is familiar
to anyone who has thought about the contest between harmonization and diversity that underlies federal systems generally. Harmonization avoids destructive competition and fosters a sense of larger community, but at the cost of impeding
sorting and specialization that might enhance national economic growth. Diversity encourages competition, but at the
expense of increasing sectionalism and the risk of destructive
conflict. The risks of pursuing either of these policies, however,
are not necessarily equal. If states are not simply involved in a
race to the bottom, but instead have idiosyncratic reasons to
pursue specific firms or industries, then the economic role that
states may play with greater success than the federal government will be enhanced. Federalism becomes important on this
vision because states and localities are different from one another, not only in natural resources that can be exploited to the
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detriment of other jurisdictions (one primary concern of the
Commerce Clause 123), but in attitudes and values towards economic development and of economic development of particular
sorts.124 Thus, in their attack on our apparent psychological
commitment to federalism, Professors Rubin and Feeley conclude:
In a truly federal system, some sub-units might not be interested in
economic efficiency at all; they might be primarily motivated by the
desire to preserve an agrarian lifestyle, to protect the environment,
or to encourage individual spirituality. These particular sub-units
might lose out in the competition for factories and chemical engineers, as the economic analysis predicts. But rather than perceiving
their losses as a chastening lesson that induces them to change their
as a positive adlaws, they
r might regard them as a necessary cost or
vantage. 5

While Rubin and Feeley write to advocate reduced attention to the concerns of federalism, their argument suggests the
very reasons why business incentives are unlikely to generate
a detrimental nationwide policy on economic developmentthat is, some jurisdictions simply will not join the race. They
may pursue other objectives that generate substantial benefits
for other members of the federation, while enjoying economic
benefits generated by jurisdictions that pursue economic objectives.
If there is sufficient variation among jurisdictions in
seeking firms, then the risks of external effects caused by
states with high preferences for attracting firms must be balanced against the risks of harmonizing economic development
policy through a broadly. construed Commerce Clause. As
Alvin Klevorick has pointed out, it cannot be that we desire
harmonization for its own sake; that result could be achieved
simply by allowing each participant in the race to reach the
bottom. 126 Nor is harmonization costless. If jurisdictions have
conflicting preferences, harmonization will force some of them
to abandon their preferences, and it is by no means clear that
123. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 570-72 (providing examples of detrimental economic exploitation by states of natural resources).
124. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., ALL OVER THE MAP: RETHINKING
AMERICAN REGIONS 11-37 (1996) (recounting the historical rise of American
Sectionalism).
125. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 921 (1994).
126. See Klevorick, supra note 103, at 181 (arguing that attempts to "level
the playing field" inadequately address problems presented by international
competition).
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harmonization will be pegged to those jurisdictions that would
suffer the greatest should their preferences be abandoned.
Ultimately, the question may come down to the game of
"Whom Do You Trust?" The more we believe that local decisionmakers are caught in cognitive error or political capture,
the less we are willing to accede to their decisions about the
propriety of incentives. The more we think that rational jurisdictions will ignore external effects that outweigh internal
benefits, the more we need some centralizing arbiter to intervene. The more we think that courts have difficulty distinguishing among development programs that generate different
economic effects from a social perspective, the less willing we
are to assign them the task of arbitrating.
The issue of interstate competition, therefore, may simply
illustrate the limits of legal intervention. Nothing in the doctrine of the Commerce Clause to this point suggests that, outside the obvious cases of monopoly exploitation, adjudication is
a good mechanism for distinguishing among state policies that
advance net social welfare and those that foster protectionism.
Perhaps law serves as a last resort in the absence of social
norms that constrain antisocial conduct. But if the fears of retaliation that drive the race-to-the-bottom logic are correct, interstate competition for firms may be particularly ripe for
regulation through extralegal constraints. While current
practice suggests that such constraints are imperfect, the implicit claim that law will not cause greater distortions requires
more thorough investigation.

